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Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era




While many Black people regarded slavery as a form of social
death,' some nineteenth-century white policy-makers extolled the
virtues of slavery as a tool to uplift the characters of Africans in
America: "[Slavery in America] has been the lever by which five
million human beings have been elevated from the degraded and
benighted condition of savage life ... to a knowledge of their
responsibilities to God and their relations to society,"2 observed a
Kentucky Congressman in 1860. These sentiments were echoed by
abolitionist northern officers not three years later when the
institution of marriage was lauded for its civilizing effect on the
newly freed men and women: "[Marriage] is the great lever by which
[the freed men and women] are to be lifted up and prepared for a
state of civilization. 3
With an increasingly heterogeneous population in the United
States, nineteenth-century social reformers considered it their
* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. Paulette Caldwell, Liz Cooper,
Nancy Cott, Mary Louise Fellows, Julie Goldscheid, Tracy Higgins, Bob Kaczorowski, Tony
Kaye, Linda McClain, Megan McClintock, Denise Morgan, Carol Rose, Reva Siegel, and Ben
Zipursky provided thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Reginald Washington,
Archivist at the National Archives in Washington, D.C., assisted me greatly in locating African
American war widow pension files. Emily Alexander and Lesley Williams provided invaluable
research assistance.
1. See ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
(1982).
2. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., app. at 200 (1860) (statement of Rep. William
Simms, Democrat of Kentucky).
3. Statement of Col. William A. Pile, Testimony taken in Kentucky, Tennessee and
Missouri, November and December 1863, the Am. Freedmen's Inquiry Comm'n, St. Louis,
Mo., Record Group 94 [hereinafter N.A. R.G. 94], M 619, roll 201, frame 139 (National
Archives, Washington, D.C.).
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project to lift uncivilized people up from a natural savage state and
mold them into proper citizens. Institutions such as slavery and
marriage provided these reformers with a domesticating technology
or lever that could pry the uncivilized apart from their savage ways.
Of course, African Americans experienced these institutions very
differently. If slavery was a kind of social death for Black people in
the United States, then Reconstruction held out the promise of social
rebirth-rebirth as enfranchised citizens and rights holders. During
the period after the Civil War, Black people in the United States
celebrated the right to alienate their labor, own property, and
participate in the institutions of civil and public society that were
considered fundamental to a good and free life. The right to marry
figured prominently among the bundle of rights African Americans
held dear in the postbellum years.
Because the status citizen had both legal and moral content for
nineteenth-century republicans, the transition of Black people from
slave to citizen was not something the larger culture regarded as self-
executing upon ratification of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. Rather, even to progressives of
this era, citizenship was something that had to be cultivated in Black
people. In this Article, I will show how the institution of marriage
was viewed as one of the primary instruments by which citizenship
was both developed and managed in African Americans.
Antebellum social rules and laws considered enslaved people
morally and legally unfit to marry. They were incapacitated from
entering into civil contracts, of which marriage was one, and were
regarded as lacking the moral fiber necessary to respect and honor
the sanctity of the marital vows. Nevertheless, many slave couples
lived together as husband and wife after undertaking wedding
celebrations as simple as jumping over a broomstick, or as elaborate
as a "Scripture Wedding,"5 or grand banquet thrown for the entire
community.' These couples considered themselves married before
the eyes of God, the community, and, in some cases, their owners.
But of course they were not married in the eyes of the law.
For many newly freed slaves in the latter half of the nineteenth
century, the ability to marry was a powerfully important aspect of
4. See HERBERT G. GUTMAN, THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, 1750-
1925, at 275-77 (1979); LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG: THE AFTERMATH
OF SLAVERY 240 (1979); ANN PATTON MALONE, SWEET CHARITY: SLAVE FAMILY AND
HOUSEHOLD STRucruRE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY LOUISIANA 224 n.64 (1992).
5. MALONE, supra note 4, at 224.
6. See id. at 225 ("When weddings were allowed, they became community observations
and social occasions rivaled only by Christmas and end-of-harvest celebrations.").
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freedom and of acceptance into civil society. Black people celebrated
the transition from marriage-in-fact to marriage-in-law, but the
transmogrification of the civil and legal status of African Americans'
intimate relationships was not bereft of both unintended and tragic
consequences. Close attention to the records of this era reveals the
paradox of legal recognition and regulation, and draws into question
the fiction of a rights discourse that fixes as victory participation in
institutions such as marriage.
African Americans did not enter civil society on their own terms
and accompanied by their own values, but rather did so on the non-
negotiable terms set by the dominant culture. Those who sought to
enjoy the benefits of legal marriage according to pre-existing Black
community norms-norms that were more fluid and more communal
than that of white culture-were harshly punished, disciplined, and
thereby domesticated by postbellum laws in ways less severe than,
but not dissimilar to, antebellum laws.
The experiences of formerly enslaved people in the immediate
postbellum period illustrates something quite important, and by no
means unique to African Americans, about the relationship between
civil rights and state regulation. The abolition of slavery is commonly
understood to have accomplished both an escape from coercive state
control and a grant of autonomy and rights. Yet, for African
Americans, the ability to exercise these new rights merely
inaugurated a different relationship with the state. Rather than
escaping from the coercive power of the state, the newly
emancipated former slaves encountered the state in new institutional
garb. Marriage, I will argue, provides the best-albeit not the only-
example of the degree to which African Americans had to be
"domesticated" before they could be admitted into society as full
citizens.
In many important respects, contemporary civil rights struggles
must be understood as the legacy of the battles won and lost by and
on behalf of African Americans in the Reconstruction era. Civil
rights movements inevitably formulate both inequity and freedom in
rights-based terms: the right to contract, to own property, to racially-
integrated education, to privacy, to vote, to speak Spanish, and to
marry a person of a different race or of the same sex. The
emancipatory force of rights-based claims made on behalf of
subordinated groups remains relatively unquestioned in modem
liberatory discourses within the academy as well as in practical
political and legal domains. Rights-based strategies have retained
this stature notwithstanding sustained, principled critiques from
various shores. Without attempting to rehearse the now well-known
1999]
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critiques and defenses of rights made elsewhere,7 yet mindful of the
difficult problems these conversations have raised, I want to
interrogate a paradox lurking in virtually all modern civil rights
movements. The struggles of abject groups to emerge from the
obscurity of the legal margins into the mainstream of civil society
often materialized through demands for legal recognition by the
state, and inclusion in the dominant legal and political institutions of
society. Marriage is a good example, but surely not the only one.'
Ignored in these struggles is the degree to which these institutions
are highly regulatory in nature: They are the sites in which the state
is actively involved in creating social and legal statuses for both men
and women in highly raced and gendered terms. Thus, an institution
like marriage accomplishes a kind of colonialism by domesticating
more "primitive" sexuality. Insofar as "sexuality... provides the
principle categories for a strategic transformation of behavior into
manipulable characterological types,"9 husbands and wives-the
primary adult units of civilized society-are the product of this
cultural positioning. The process by which previously enslaved men
and women became free husbands and wives reveals a great deal
about the manner in which the assertion of rights initiates regulation
by a "bureaucratic juridical apparatus""0 even as those rights are
asserted as a means of liberation.
What tends to be obscured in marriage-based civil rights strategies
7. Just as Critical Legal Studies theorists sought to destabilize the legitimacy of fights-
based claims for justice, Critical Race Theorists argued for their retention as their exercise
signaled the legal and political personhood of previously disenfranchised groups. For the
Critical Legal Studies critique of rights, see, for example, DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE
BOTroM OF THE WELL (1992); Jack Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669 (1990);
Mark V. Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1363 (1984). For Critical Race Theory
responses to the critique of rights, see, for example, PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF
RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Robert Williams, Jr., Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils and
Promise of Critical Legal Theory for Peoples of Color, 5 LAW & INEQ. J. 103 (1987).
8. Another ight incident to emancipation that was widely considered to be fundamental to
African Americans' legal and practical freedom was the right to contract freely-particularly
to contract for one's own labor. Yet, no sooner were African Americans allowed to enter into
labor contracts, than southern states began to enact harsh codes that punished public
dependence and vagrancy. Amy Dru Stanley forcefully demonstrates the degree to which the
freed men and women were met with "a double message: an affirmation of the former slaves'
right to liberty and a warning that freedom barred dependence." AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM
BONDAGE TO CONTRACT 123 (1998). Thus, Stanley cites to the explicit policy of the
Freedmen's Bureau that at once empowered and regulated African Americans in the name of
freedom: "'While the freedmen must and will be protected in their rights, they must be
required to meet these first and foremost conditions of a state of freedom, a visible means of
support, and fidelity to contracts."' Id. (quoting Orders Issued by the Commissioner and
Assistant Commissioners of the Freedmen's Bureau, H.R. EXEC. DOC. No. 39-70, at 139, 155
(1865)) (emphasis in original).
9. LEO BERSANI, HoMOS 3 (1995).
10. WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY 121 n.41 (1995).
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is the manner in which abject status is exchanged for that of
civil(ized) subject, tamed by the disciplinary technology of public
marital norms. Civil rights, it becomes clear, come at a price:
Historically, rights emerged in modernity both as a vehicle of
emancipation from political disenfranchisement or
institutionalized servitude and as a means of privileging an
emerging bourgeois class within a discourse of formal
egalitarianism and universal citizenship. Thus, they emerged
both as a means of protection against arbitrary use and abuse by
sovereign and social power as a mode of securing and
naturalizing dominant social powers-class, gender and so
forth.1
Wendy Brown poses the problem as follows: "When does identity
articulated through rights become production? When does legal
recognition become an instrument of regulation, and political
recognition become an instrument of subordination?"' 2
Primary archival evidence as well as postbellum legal opinions
demonstrate that African Americans who emerged from slavery to
participate freely in society were transformed in subtle and not so
subtle ways into the kinds of citizens upon which southern society
depended at that time. Historian Nancy Cott claims that "[o]ne
might go so far as to say that the institution of marriage and the
modern state have been mutually constitutive." 3 Without question,
African Americans have been called upon, and often coerced, to
play a role in nation-building at different times in different ways."
The evidence I discuss below demonstrates the extent to which
matrimonial laws and norms afforded African American people
social and economic benefits that had been previously foreclosed to
them, but on the condition that African Americans abide by the
race- and gender-based rules of bourgeois culture. Moreover, the
complex way in which African Americans were inducted into the
regulatory regime of marriage can be explained by reference to the
felicitous convergence of the interests of Blacks and white males.
White men had their own stake in Freedpeople's adherence to
11. Id. at 99; see alsoSTANLEY, supra note 8, at 175-217.
12. BROWN, supra note 10, at 99.
13. Nancy F. Cott, Giving Character to Our Whole Civil Polity: Marriage and the Public
Order in the Late Nineteenth Century, in U.S. HISTORY AS WOMEN'S HISTORY 107,109 (Linda
Kerber & Alice Kessler-Harris eds., 1995).
14. See, e.g., AM. FREEDMEN'S INQUIRY COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN
FREEDMEN'S INQUIRY COMMISSION TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR (May 15, 1864), S. EXEC.
DOC. NO. 38-53, at 99 (1st Sess. 1864) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT] ("We need the negro not
only as a soldier to aid in quelling the rebellion, but as a loyal citizen to assist in reconstructing
on a permanently peaceful and orderly basis the insurrectionary South.").
1999] 255
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marriage laws wholly independent from any altruistic concern for
Black civil rights or personal sovereignty.
In Part II, I discuss the various ways in which enslaved people
organized their intimate sexual relationships. 5 I examine secondary
materials discussing the nature of slave society, as well as
Freedmen's Bureau reports and war widow pension applications
containing transcripts of interviews with formerly enslaved women in
which they discuss the kinds of relationships maintained by enslaved
Black people. These materials reveal that while many enslaved
people preferred to live as husband and wife, thereby making life-
long, monogamous commitments to one another, 6 slave communities
acknowledged other acceptable arrangements: "taking up,"
"sweethearting," living together, and trial marriages. Couples who
took up or were sweethearts were not necessarily monogamous,
although they could be. It was acceptable for enslaved women to
bear children in all manner of relationships. These primary and
secondary materials indicate that slave societies permitted a range of
sexual relationships for their members.
After emancipation, formerly enslaved people were granted the
right to marry legally. An array of laws were passed legitimizing both
slave marriages and the children that had been born to enslaved
parents. In Part III, I explore the ways in which formerly enslaved
people were folded into civilized and free society through their
inclusion in the institution of marriage. It cannot be denied that
many African American people had lived as husband and wife while
enslaved. The legitimization of their relationships did little to affect
the form of those relationships. However, I show that for a
significant number of former slaves, legal marriage was not
experienced as a source of validation and empowerment, but as
discipline and punishment when the rigid rules of legal marriage
were transgressed, often unintentionally. Thus, the robust
15. While it is entirely possible, no doubt likely, that some enslaved people engaged in sex
with other people of the same sex, there was certainly no gay or lesbian identity amongst
enslaved people, nor, for that matter, amongst the dominant white culture, as the categories
lesbian and gay are a more modem invention. Same-sex sexuality among enslaved people
would certainly make an interesting subject of inquiry. However, I leave that to others to
explore. I have limited my observations here to heterosexual sexuality amongst enslaved
people.
16. Of course this commitment was constrained by the exogenous threat that the master
could separate families by selling one or more members at any time. For this reason, some
slave weddings ended not with the familiar climax "till death do you part," but with variations
such as "till death or buckra part you." EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE
WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 481 (1974). One Virginia master married his slaves with the
following vows: "Dat yo' wife, Dat yo' husban', Ise yo' Marser, She yo' Missus, You're
Married." LITWACK, supra note 4, at 240.
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enforcement of bigamy, fornication, and adultery laws served to
domesticate African American people who were either unaware of,
or ignored, the formal requirements of marital formation and
dissolution, or who chose to conduct their intimate sexual
relationships in ways that fell outside the matrimonial norms of
Victorian society. In the end, the efforts of African Americans to
maintain a spectrum of intimate sexual relationships in the
postbellum period had to give way to the dictates of positive
marriage laws. Part III shows how the process of becoming husbands
and wives was not a benign one whereby the state lent its imprimatur
to autonomous, self-defining couples, but rather was coercive in
nature: Previously acceptable behavior was punished and the
regulatory force of the state was invoked so as to mold the newly
freed slaves into citizens. These cases illustrate "public authority
using marriage policy to create a social order" and to create proper
citizens."
The right to marry that African Americans enjoyed in the
postbellum period must be understood within a cultural context in
which marriage and the family were institutions employed by the
larger culture to promote certain social and economic values.
Reform of the law of marriage during this period played a key role in
advancing these agendas. In Part IV, I argue that African Americans
were granted the right to marry at precisely the moment when that
right was being radically transformed in such a way that the public
interest in marriage took priority over private interests in the
creation of autonomous intimate partnerships. In this Part, I provide
an account of the implications of the prosecution and incarceration
of African Americans-more often men than women-for violating
laws regulating matrimonial morality. The aggressiveness with which
African American men were prosecuted for matrimonial deviance
can be seen as an epiphenomenon of changes in white masculinity
and agency that were taking place in postbellum industrializing
America more generally. If the integrity of white male agency could
no longer be anchored as the antinomy of Black chattel slavery, since
all men were now, at least in theory, free market actors, then white
masculinity required new ground against which to be set off. This
task was complicated by the fact that wage laborers in the Gilded
Age were in a famously weak position to negotiate with industrialists
over wages and working conditions. Thus, as Nancy Cott"t and Amy
17. Cott, supra note 13, at 119.
18. See Nancy F. Cott, Marriage and Women's Citizenship in the United States, 1830-1934,
103 AM. HIST. REV. 1440 (1998).
1999]
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Dru Stanley9 have argued, white men needed to construct a new
domain other than slavery against which to contrast masculine
agency. Marriage and the domestic sphere of the feminine became
that fiction. It would have been calamitous for African American
men to be able to opt out of this important regulatory regime. Thus
African Americans entered the domain of marriage just as its
institutional boundaries became heavily freighted in new ways.
This Part concludes with the observation that the use of criminal
prosecutions accomplished the disenfranchisement of Blackmen and
supported the creation of a criminal leasing system in which Black
male prisoners were leased out to white planters to work the fields
under conditions that were, in many respects, worse than those
during slavery.
Thus, winning the right to marry was a source of great celebration
as well as great suffering for many African Americans in the
postbellum period. This is hardly surprising, given that it did not take
place in isolation from the material and symbolic interests of the
larger Victorian culture.
II. AFRICAN AMERICAN RELATIONSHIPS UNDER SLAVERY
An extensive historical literature has documented the
circumstances and experiences of slave domestic life and kinship
formation.' Indeed, family life amongst enslaved people has recently
attracted renewed interest from feminist historians, as evidenced by
several outstanding new texts.2 This literature portrays anything but
a singular account of slave family structures and reflects, in part, a
desire to provide an historical response to contemporary narratives
about the pathology of the modern black family.
A. The Historiography of Slave Families
Early accounts advanced a pathological view of slave families.
These narratives generally portrayed enslaved people as culturally
19. See STANLEY, supra note 8.
20. See, e.g., J.W. BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE COMMUNITY: PLANTATION LIFE IN THE
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1972); E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER, THE NEGRO FAMILY IN THE UNITED
STATES (1939); GENOVESE, supra note 16; GUTMAN, supra note 4; KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE
PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1956); DEBORAH GREY
WHITE, AR'N'T I A WOMAN?: FEMALE SLAVES IN THE PLANTATION SOUTH (1985).
21. See, e.g., LAURA EDWARDS, GENDERED STRIFE AND CONFUSION: THE POLITICAL
CULTURE OF RECONSTRUCTION (1997); NORALEE FRANKEL, FREEDOM'S WOMEN: BLACK
WOMEN AND FAMILIES IN CIVIL WAR ERA MISSISSIPPI (1999); TERA HUNTER, To 'JOY MY
FREEDOM: SOUTHERN BLACK WOMEN'S LIVES AND LABORS AFTER THE CIVIL WAR (1997);
MALONE, supra note 4; BRENDA E. STEVENSON, LIFE IN BLACK AND WHITE: FAMILY AND
COMMUNITY IN THE SLAVE SOUTH (1996).
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and essentially inferior to whites, the men alternately as overly
sexual, violent beasts or as passive and dependent Sambos, and the
women as oversexed Jezebels or nurturing Mammys" The American
Freedman's Inquiry Commission, a body created by the War
Department in 1863 to develop recommendations for dealing with
African Americans after emancipation, heard testimony that "[i]t is a
very rare thing to find female virtue among [Negroes]." ' In its
preliminary report to the Secretary of War, the Commission stated
that enslaved people spent "the night in huts of a single room, where
all ages and both sexes herded promiscuously. Young girls of
fifteen-some of an earlier age-became mothers, not only without
marriage, but often without any pretence [sic] of fidelity to which
even a slave could give that name."24 Indeed, the perceived sexual
depravity of enslaved people seemed to fascinate nineteenth-century
white observers. The remarks of a Mississippi planter were typical in
this regard:
As to their habits of amalgamation and intercourse, I know of
no means whereby to regulate them, or to restrain them; I
attempted it for many years, preaching virtue and decency,
encouraging marriages, and by punishing, with some severity,
departures from marital obligations; but it was all in vain.'
These views persisted well into the next century. In 1956 Kenneth
Stampp described both the "indifference with which most fathers
and even some mothers regarded their children" among enslaved
people, and "widespread sexual promiscuity."26
In the 1950s through the 1970s, prominent historians of African
American life and culture such as E. Franklin Frazier 7 and Stanley
Elkins' sought to counter these well-accepted images of African
Americans living under slavery by telling a different story. By their
22. See, e.g., PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK
WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA 85-90 (1984); WHITE, supra note 20, at 27-61, 164-65.
23. Statement of Col. William A. Pile, Testimony taken in Kentucky, Tennessee and
Missouri, November and December 1863, N.A. R.G. 94, supra note 3, at M 619, roll 201, frame
139.
24. AM. FREEDMEN'S INQUIRY COMM'N, PRELIMINARY REPORT TOUCHING THE
CONDITION AND MANAGEMENT OF EMANCIPATED REFUGEES; S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 38-53, at 5
(1st Sess. 1863) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY REPORT].
25. X DEBOW'S REVIEW 623 (1836), quoted in BLASSINGAME, supra note 20, at 153.
26. STAMPP, supra note 20, at 346. Stampp is regarded as responsible for promoting the
"Sambo thesis" of African American slave identity. See DONNA L. FRANKLIN, ENSURING
INEQUALITY: THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN FAMILY 7-
8 (1997).
27. See FRAZIER, supra note 20.




Franke: Becoming a Citizen
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 11: 251
account, the form of slave family life was not traceable to some
intrinsic pathology, but to the annihilating effects that slavery had on
African American culture.' Frazier observed that
the Negro, stripped of his cultural heritage, acquired a new
personality on American soi .... [T]he emergence of the slave
as a human being was facilitated by his assimilation into the
household of the master race. There he took over more or less
the ideas and attitudes and morals and manners of his masters.
His marriage and family relations reflected the different stages
and aspects of this process."
Thus, for the historians of this era, "the environment of the slave
experience had been such as to exclude the development of black
marriage and family norms."'" These authors contended that, by
patterning their family lives upon those of their masters, some
enslaved people formed long-term, monogamous relationships and
raised their children in nuclear-type families. By forming these kinds
of kinship networks-networks remarkably similar to those of
European Americans-African Americans were able to survive the
devastation of slavery." Nineteenth-century sources reinforce this
view. The American Freedman's Inquiry Commission observed that
"[the Negro] is found quite ready to copy whatever he believes are
the rights and obligations of what he looks up to as the superior
race. 33
These new narratives of slave family life were designed to remove
the stigma of the weak male, the female-headed household, and
loose morals, for which modern Black families had been condemned.
Reflecting upon this scholarship, Brenda Stevenson observed that
many of these scholars were unable to resist the temptation to make
29. See, e.g., STEVENSON, supra note 21, at 226-57. Kenneth Stampp argued that
[iln Africa the Negroes had been accustomed to a strictly regulated family life and a
rigidly enforced moral code. But in America the disintegration of their social
organization removed the traditional sanctions which had encouraged them to respect
their old customs .... Here, as at so many other points, the slaves had lost their native
culture without being able to find a workable substitute and therefore lived in a kind of
cultural chaos.
STAMPP, supra note 20, at 340.
30. FRAZIER, supra note 20, at 32.
31. Brenda Stevenson, Black Family Structure in Colonial and Antebellum Virginia:
Amending the Revisionist Perspective, in THE DECLINE IN MARRIAGE AMONG AFRICAN
AMERICANS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 27, 30 (M. Belinda
Tucker & Claudia Mitchell-Kernan eds., 1995).
32. Scholars of the time "largely attributed the long-term survival of enslaved African
Americans to the viability of the slave family as their principal sociocultural institution." Id. at
28.
33. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 24, at 6.
10
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss2/2
Franke
implicit comparisons between the slaves' marital and familial
practices and those of European Americans. This politically-
motivated historical project rested on the premise that if, and only if,
they could document that the historical Black family was similar in
design, structure, function, and relations to that of whites, then could
they effectively argue that it had a positive impact on Black life.'
Herbert Gutman's now classic 1979 book, The Black Family in
Slavery and Freedom, 1750-1925, picked up this theme explicitly in
response to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan's 1965 study, The
Negro Family in America: The Case for National Action.5 Moynihan
maintained that the "tangle of pathology" of contemporary Black
families could be traced to the manner in which slavery forced the
formation of fatherless matrifocal families that were incapable of
imparting the values necessary for successful and responsible adult
life. 6 Gutman sought to debunk Moynihan's thesis by showing that
enslaved people had formed viable nuclear families, notwithstanding
all of the structural impediments to traditional family formation."
Thus, in The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom, Gutman set out
to document in great detail how "ordinary black men, women, and
children.., adapted to enslavement by developing distinctive
domestic arrangements and kin networks that nurtured a new Afro-
American culture. ' ' 8
Now, a number of years after Gutman's work retold the story of
slave family life, a new generation of historians has sketched out a
different portrait of slave intimate relationships that challenges what
has come to be called the "Gutman thesis," the view that most
enslaved people lived in nuclear, male-headed households and in
monogamous, long-term relationships. In particular, the works of
contemporary historians Brenda Stevenson,39 Tony Kaye,' Ann
Patton Malone,41 Laura Edwards,42 Donna Franklin,43 and Noralee
34. See Stevenson, supra note 31, at 28.
35. See GUTMAN, supra note 4, at xvii-xviii; OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965)
[hereinafter NEGRO FAMILY].
36. NEGRO FAMILY, supra note 35, at 29.
37. See GUTMAN, supra note 4, at 461-75.
38. Id. at 3.
39. See STEVENSON, supra note 21; Stevenson, supra note 31.
40. See Tony Kaye, The Personality of Power: The Ideology of Slaves in the Natchez
District and the Delta of Mississippi, 1830-1865 (unpublished draft Ph.D. dissertation,
Columbia University) (on file with author).
41. See MALONE, supra note 4.
42. See EDWARDS, supra note 21; Laura Edwards, "The Marriage Covenant is at the
Foundation of all Our Rights": The Politics of Slave Marriages in North Carolina after
Emancipation, 14 L. & HIST. REV. 81 (1996).
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Frankel" have challenged many fundamental aspects of the Gutman
thesis.
These historians have described a complex constellation of
relationships formed by African Americans in the antebellum
period. Brenda Stevenson concludes that "slave marriages and
families exhibited a diversity of form and relationship that marked
them [as] substantially different from those of European Americans.
Even when enslaved people did live in nuclear households and
sustained monogamous marriages, these institutions did not function
similarly to those of contemporary whites."45 In addition to marrying,
enslaved adults "sweethearted," "took up," and lived together in
non-marital relationships.
Tony Kaye has provided the richest and most nuanced account of
the various forms and meanings of these relationships. He describes
sweethearting as a frequently non-monogamous relationship,
entered into primarily by young people: "a temporary tie that
entailed more prerogatives than obligations and many new feelings
and pleasures.., many sweethearts had children together."' These
children were often described as "sweetheart children.
47
Like "sweethearting," "taking up" was an open-ended and non-
exclusive type of relationship. Kaye concludes that "taking up" was a
way to describe the non-exclusive relationships of older people, or
sweethearts that had been together for some time.'  The
relationships of couples who had "taken up" could mature into ones
in which they were regarded by the community as living together or
married. Kaye concludes that "sweethearting" and "taking up" were
distinguished from "living together" and marriage by two important
factors: the nature of the commitment they represented, and the
degree to which the relationships were mediated by others.
According to Kaye's analysis, "[s]laves believed that living together,
like marriage, obliged husbands and wives to stick to each other for
43. See FRANKLIN, supra note 26.
44. See FRANKEL, supra note 21; Noralee Frankel, Workers, Wives, and Mothers: Black
Women in Mississippi, 1860-1870 (1983) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, George Washington
University) (on file with author) [hereinafter Workers, Wives, and Mothers].
45. Stevenson, supra note 31, at 52-53.
46. Kaye, supra note 40, at 7-9.
47. See Testimony of Susan Alexander (Dec. 26, 1874), in Pension File of Allen Alexander
(certificate 97,533), Bureau of Pensions, Civil War and Later Pension Files, 1861-1942,
Widow's Certificate Series, Record Group 15 (National Archives, Washington, D.C.)
[hereinafter N.A. R.G. 15], cited in Kaye, supra note 40, at 7-9. The pension files are boxed as
original paper documents. The files contain application numbers if a pension was applied for
but never awarded, and certificate numbers if a pension was awarded.
48. See Kaye, supra note 40, at 9-10.
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life and to be monogamous for the duration."49 So too, living
together and marriage were relationships of a more public nature:
Couples who sweethearted or took up were slaves who found
that the most straightforward course between the conflicting
claims of romantic desire and chattel property was to keep their
relationship entirely their own affair. Whereas couples took
some pains to enlist both their fellow slaves and their owners to
participate in marriage ceremonies or recognize husbands and
wives who were living together, sweethearts and couples who
were taking up went to great lengths to be left to their own
devices. 0
Brenda Stevenson's research led to the same conclusion: "[T]he
family history of slaves in colonial and antebellum Virginia offers
compelling evidence that many slaves did not have a nuclear
structure or 'core' in their families, and there is little evidence that
suggests that a nuclear family was their sociological ideal."51 Rather,
"[p]olygyny, or something akin to it in which a slave man had long-
standing, continuous intimate relationships with more than one
woman probably was a much more popular alternative to monogamy
than has been realized. 52
Laura Edwards finds similar evidence of the role that community
recognition played in the formalization of the relationships of
enslaved people. When one previously-married member of the
couple began to live with another person openly, the community
treated the former marriage as dissolved. 3 It was also common for
enslaved people to enter "trial marriages" of several weeks or years,
during which time the couple would check each other out. Harriet
Beecher Stowe recounted a female slave's description of her
relationship with a man as: "[W]e lib along two year-he watchin my
ways and I watchin his ways. '
Underlying these different accounts of the nature of slave family
life are disputes as to the facts of life under slavery, as well as
questions regarding the agency of enslaved people. Did African
Americans in the antebellum period overwhelmingly enter into
monogamous, nuclear relationships, or did their intimate
relationships take on a variety of forms in addition to that which
49. Id. at 17.
50. Id. at 13.
51. Stevenson, supra note 31, at 36.
52. STEVENSON, supra note 21, at 233.
53. See Edwards, supra note 42, at 109.
54. HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, THE KEY To UNCLE TOM'S CABIN 298-301 (1854),
quoted in GUTMAN, supra note 4, at 64.
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mirrored traditional bourgeois marriage? Whatever form these
relationships took, could we understand them to reflect the vestiges
of African cultural norms?5 Were these relationships the results of
meaningful choices made as acts of survival and resistance to the
crushing reality of slavery, or could enslaved people "learn only from
their owners so that slave culture, a source of slave belief and
behavior, was at best 'imitative'... little more than responses to
master-sponsored external stimuli"?"
In the end, the same evidence viewed from different vantage
points leads to very different explanations for why enslaved people
formed the families they did. As a preliminary matter, no
generalization about the behavior of enslaved people would hold
true for the entire system of chattel slavery, as the variations in the
conditions of enslavement from one locality to another were often
dramatic. In Louisiana, it was common for enslaved people to be
housed in barracks, whereas in most other regions family cabins were
more the norm.57 Evidence of a custom in many locations in favor of
nuclear family groupings accompanied by informal marriages and
monogamous coupling might lead one to conclude, as Gutman did,
that this custom was an expression of the preferences of enslaved
people. But it is equally true that planters consciously used housing
policy, distribution of extra rations, marriage ceremonies, and work
assignments in order to manipulate the birth rates among their
enslaved workers. This is not to argue that enslaved women were
passively reacting to the incentivizing strategies of their masters,
since enslaved women in other countries reacted differently to the
tactics of owners to maximize fertility. Rather, the formation of
55. See MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, THE MYTH OF THE NEGRO PAST (1941).
56. GUTMAN, supra note 4, at 32; see alsoAriela Gross, "Like Master, Like Man":
Constructing Whiteness in the Commercial Law of Slavery, 1800-1861, 18 CARDOZO L. REV.
263 (1996) (discussing cases for breach of warranty in sale of slaves, which show that
determination of slave character was a reflection of the owner's character).
57. See ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL, WITHOUT CONSENT OR CONTRACT: THE RISE AND
FALL OF AMERICAN SLAVERY (1989); MALONE, supra note 4. Many authors have
documented the common practice by which slave men and women were forced by their
masters to "marry" and reproduce. See, e.g., LITWACK, supra note 4, at 234.
58. See FOGEL, supra note 57, at 153; JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF
SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK, AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT 20
(1985); MALONE, supra note 4, at 16-18, 180; LESLIE A. SCHWALM, "A HARD FIGHT FOR
WE": WOMEN'S TRANSITION FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM IN SOUTH CAROLINA 19-44
(1997); John Campbell, Work, Pregnancy, and Infant Mortality among Southern Slaves, 14 J.
INTERDISC. HIST. 793 (1984); Christopher Morris, The Articulation of Two Worlds: The
Master-Slave Relationship Reconsidered, 85 J. AM. HIST. 982, 988-89 (1998).
59. See BARBARA BUSH, SLAVE WOMEN IN CARIBEAN SOCIETY, 1650-1838, at 120-50
(1990); SIDNEY W. MINTZ, CARIBBEAN TRANSFORMATIONS (1984); Barbara Bush-Slimani,
Hard Labour: Women, Childbirth, and Resistance in British Caribbean Slave Societies, 36 HIST.
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families under slavery must be understood as a complex synthesis of
planter coercion and incentives and slave resistance and
accommodation.
Thus, the search for an "authentic" African American culture is no
longer either an interesting or viable question.' An uncompromising
account of the agency of enslaved persons that portrays it as a force
struggling to break through the enveloping canopy of white planters'
acts of coercion fails to acknowledge how human agency is a
synthesis of resistance, assimilation, and persistence." Recent
scholarship by Christopher Morris persuasively demonstrates how
the behavior of planters and slaves could be mutually constitutive:
The master-slave relationship was not entirely the conscious
creation of paternalistic slaveholders or resistant slaves. On the
contrary, the structures of that relationship shaped the ways in
which both might act paternalistically or capitalistically,
accommodatingly or rebelliously. Both master and slave,
whether through consent or through concession, acted within
structural/systemic boundaries and by so doing they tended to
perpetuate the status quo.62
Morris does not mean to imply that the perpetuation of slavery was
desired by enslaved people, but rather that there were numerous
ways in which the organization of slave life that was less oppressive
to slaves could also coincide with making slavery profitable for
masters. Thus, "[o]n a structural level.., dominance and resistance
could become reciprocal, both perpetuating the conditions necessary
to sustain the system."63
In the section that follows, I will describe the array of domestic
arrangements entered into by African American people while
WORKSHOP 36 (1993).
60. In another context, Kathryn Abrams has undertaken the project of investigating the
possibility and meaning of female agency under conditions of overwhehning constraint
imposed by patriarchy. See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in
Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 305 (1995); Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the
Complex Female Subject, 92 MicH. L. REv. 2479 (1994).
61. In this sense the search for an authentic African American slave family mistakenly
assumes that "real" African culture maintains authenticity only by remaining static and a-
historical while permitting the modem to adapt and evolve.
62. Morris, supra note 58, at 987. In this article, Morris contrasts two plantations. On the
first plantation, the planter determined that it would be more profitable to abandon growing
cotton and instead engage in a "slave breeding" business, which led him to improve the
domestic conditions in which the slaves lived. The second planter decided to maximize profits
from his rice plantation by minimizing expenditures on the material needs of the slaves. Thus,
the first owner raised living conditions in order to raise people, whereas the second sacrificed
people for profits from rice. In the first case the slave birthrate was 12%, whereas in the
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enslaved, according to their own reports as well as the observations
of white Freedmen's Bureau agents. These primary materials
disclose no generalizable truth about the intimate lives of enslaved
people, but instead reflect the diverse ways in which Black people
adjusted to the inhumane situations in which they found themselves.
These documents also reveal the complex ways in which planters
adapted their behavior in response to slave culture and resistance.
B. Relationships Among Enslaved People-Primary Accounts
A rich array of primary archival sources provides a lens through
which to view the intimate relationships of enslaved people. I
examine two sets of materials that supply particularly detailed
accounts of the ways in which enslaved people chose sexual partners
and arranged their intimate lives. One group of sources consists of
affidavits made out by African American women in support of their
applications for war widows' pensions after their husbands died
fighting in colored regiments in the Civil War. The second group is
composed of reports filed by Freedmen's Bureau and other federal
agents describing their observations about the domestic customs of
African American people.'
These materials show several interesting things about the kinds of
relationships Black people entered into during the ante- and
postbellum eras. Black men were known to have more than one wife,
sometimes with the consent of their owners. Some slave couples
considered themselves married in the absence of any religious or
public ceremony and simply decided to live as husband and wife.
Women drew a distinction between being married to a man and
merely "having one," and bearing children did not seem to affect this
status. Some formerly enslaved couples underwent marriage
ceremonies after emancipation even though they considered
themselves married prior to the ceremonies,' while others felt no
64. While these two sets of materials are replete with minute details and grand statements
about the lives of Black people during the ante- and postbellum periods, the reliability of both
are subject to reasonable contestation. As to the Pension Bureau applications of war widows,
the purpose for which the affidavits were supplied to the Bureau-proof of a valid marriage-
provided an incentive for applicants to distort the facts in such a way as to have the Bureau
favorably dispose of their claims. Similarly, the white Freedmen's Bureau agents' descriptions
of the lives of Black people are subject to the distortion of the agents' racism, unfamiliarity
with cultural norms amongst enslaved people, and their own personal agendas. Keeping these
concerns in mind, I remain convinced that both sets of material provide valuable evidence of
the nature of intimate relationships amongst Black people in the antebellum period.
65. The daughter-in-law of Daniel Williams's owner testified that "Daniel and Henrietta
ran away to Natchez, Miss., to get married although they were as good as married for at least a
year before this." Affidavit of Anna B. Allen (Aug. 23, 1884), in Pension File of Daniel
Williams (application 167,134), N.A. R.G. 15, supra note 47.
266
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need to further solemnize their relationships once they were legally
permitted to do so.'
The enormously high casualty rates of Union soldiers resulted in
the impoverishment of hundreds of thousands of surviving widows
and children: "The accumulated bloodshed of the war's first fifteen
months made the care of bereaved families a central issue by the
summer of 1862, when Congress expanded federal responsibility for
military families. 67 Survivors of deceased white soldiers were the
beneficiaries Congress had in mind when the pension laws were
amended in 1862.' Yet, shortly after colored soldiers began to fight
in the Union army in early 1863,69 the federal government's Pension
Bureau was faced with war widow pension claims filed by Black
women whose husbands had died in the war. In fact, once Black men
were conscripted, their casualties were exceedingly high. The
Confederate Secretary of War declared that captured Black Union
soldiers were not to be treated as prisoners of war, but rather as
"slaves in arms" who were to be turned over to local authorities
whereupon they were executed as incendiaries or insurrectionists.7 °
To Confederate officials, "[t]he most efficient way to deal with the
vexing issue of black prisoners was to take no prisoners."7
Then, in April 1864, Confederate soldiers massacred an estimated
eight hundred Union troops, half of whom were Black, at Fort
Pillow, Tennessee. The Fort Pillow massacre prompted Congress to
contend with the problems of proof that had arisen in Black women's
66. See, e.g., Pension File of Charles Alfred (certificate 177,642), N.A. R.G. 15, supra note
47.
67. Megan J. McClintock, Civil War Pensions and the Reconstruction of Union Families, 83
J. AM. HIST. 456, 461 (1996) (providing an outstanding account of the Civil War pension
system and what its record§ reveal about family formations in the 19th century).
68. See Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 166, 12 Stat. 566 (1862) (establishing Civil War pensions).
69. Notwithstanding an overwhelming need to raise troops, and even after issuance of the
preliminary version of the Emancipation Proclamation in July, 1862, President Lincoln
opposed the enlistment of Black men into the Union army. "From Lincoln's point of view it
made more sense to talk of colonizing the blacks out of the country than to plan on making
them soldiers." DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 430 (1995). Without Lincoln's
knowledge, in the summer of 1862, War Department Secretary Edwin Stanton had already
approved the use of Black troops in South Carolina, Louisiana, and Kansas. Of course, the
final Emancipation Proclamation, issued in September 1862, reflected Lincoln's acquiescence
to the pressure of his advisors that Black troops be conscripted. "By spring, the President was
urging a massive recruitment of negro troops." Id. at 431. DUDLEY TAYLOR, THE SABLE
ARM: NEGRO TROOPS IN THE UNION ARMY, 1861-1865 (1956) is authoritative on this issue;
see alsoLITWACK, supra note 4, at 65-79 (describing Black interest in and white resistance to
the recruitment of Black men for a "liberating army").
70. See LrrWACK, supra note 4, at 88.
71. Id. at 89 ("'No orders, threats, or commands,' a Confederate soldier reported, 'could
restrain the men from vengeance on the negroes, and they were piled in great heaps about the
wagons, in the tangled brushwood, and upon muddy and trampled roads."').
17
Franke: Becoming a Citizen
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 11: 251
pension claims.' Senator Lafayette Foster sponsored a bill designed
to address this issue because
there is this unfortunate distinction between the widows and
children of white and black soldiers: the blacks who come from
the slave States, and who probably were slaves before they
entered the service, although they had wives and children, were
not, according to the laws of the States within which they lived,
legally married. [TIhey could not by law be recognized as the
wives or widows and children of the persons thus killed.73
The Pension Statute was amended on July 4, 1864, entitling the
free widows and children of colored soldiers killed in the war to a
pension "without other proof of marriage than that the parties had
habitually recognized each other as man and wife, and lived together
as such for a definite period next preceding the soldier's enlistment,
not less than two years, to be shown by the affidavits of credible
witnesses. 74 An exception was made for those claimants who had
"resided in any state in which their marriage may have been
solemnized, the usual evidence shall be required."75
This law was amended in 1866 after emancipation made it possible
for freed men and women to marry. Under the new law, regardless
of whether the claimant had been free or enslaved when she had
married the deceased soldier, Black war widow pension claimants
were permitted to submit "proof, satisfactory to the Commissioner
of Pensions, that the parties had habitually recognized each other as
man and wife, and lived together as such. 7 6 The standard of proof
required to demonstrate a valid African American marriage was
amended one last time in 1873, when Congress required "satisfactory
proof that the parties were joined in marriage by some ceremony
deemed by them obligatory, or habitually recognized each other as
man and wife and were so recognized by their neighbors, and lived
together as such up to the date of enlistment."'
The Commissioner of Pensions was thus faced with evaluating
claims by war widows for federal pensions in light of these statutory
72. See McClintock, supra note 67, at 473.
73. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3233 (1864) (statement of Sen. Lafayette Foster,
Republican of Connecticut).
74. Act of July 4, 1864, ch. 247, § 14, 13 Stat. 387 (1864) (supplementing Act of July 14,
1862, supra note 68, which granted pensions).
75. Id.
76. Act of June 6, 1866, ch. 106, § 14, 14 Stat. 56 (1866) (supplementing several acts
relating to pensions).
77. Act of June 6, 1873, ch. 234, § 11, 17 Stat. 566 (1873) (revising, consolidating, and
amending laws relating to pensions).
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definitions of valid African American marriages. Thus, the pension
files of African American widows are full of statements provided by
the widows themselves, neighbors, Black clergy, slave masters and
others attesting to the nature and form of adult relationships
between enslaved and free Black people.
Many of the files support Gutman's thesis that relationships
among enslaved adults in the antebellum period conformed to
traditional norms of monogamous marriage. Quite frequently,
enslaved men and women were married in ceremonies conducted by
slave preachers. One pension claimant referred to her 1861 marriage
by a Black preacher as adhering to "slave rules."' Ellen Waters's
application is typical in this regard. Her husband Aaron enlisted in
the Union army on September 15, 1863, immediately after he had
been freed by the Emancipation Proclamation, and died less than
two years later from dysentery, a common cause of death among
Civil War soldiers.79 Ellen Waters was granted a monthly pension of
eight dollars based upon her own testimony as well as testimony
provided by two former slaves. They had witnessed the April 3, 1862,.
ceremony in Jefferson County, Arkansas, in which Ellen Moore and
Aaron Waters had been married by Major Waters, "a colored
Baptist preacher,"' described as "an illiterate colored man.""l These
statements sufficed to establish a marriage under the 1864 pension
act since Mr. and Mrs. Waters "were slaves at the time of the
marriage and consequently there was no church or other public
record of said event in existence."'
Similar facts were testified to in the pension file of Elias Johnson, a
free Black man who enlisted in the First Regiment of the U.S.
Colored Troops in Washington, D.C., on May 19, 1863, and died of
dysentery on September 6, 1864. His wife, the former Nancy
Gordon, was described in the 1846 court papers certifying her
freedom as "a dark copper coloured woman.., about five feet and
half an inch high, rather handsome face, sharp pointed chin, and fine
regular features, hair long and black and nearly straight and a scar
from a burn on the front part of the neck." 3 Beginning on September
78. Secondary Proof of Marriage (Nov. 12, 1896), in Pension File of Collin Johnson
(application 643,658), N.A. R.G. 15, supra note 47.
79. See Widow's Pension Application, Summary of Proof, in Pension File of Aaron Waters
(certificate 157,761), N.A. R.G. 15, supra note 47.
80. Affidavit of Ellen Waters (Mar. 14, 1871), in id.
81. Affidavit of Agnes Waters and Lucinda Waters (July 16, 1866), in id.
82. Affidavit of Ellen Waters (Mar. 14, 1871), in id.
83. Affidavit of William Brent, Clerk of the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia (Oct.
2, 1843), in Pension File of Elias Johnson (certificate 56,536), N.A. R.G. 15, supra note 47.
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6, 1864, Mrs. Johnson received a monthly widow's pension of eight
dollars from the Bureau of Pensions. In order to secure the pension,
Mrs. Johnson had produced the following two documents: a
notarized marriage certificate issued by Reverend G. Brown, Pastor
of the First Colored Baptist Church in Washington City, D.C., dated
March 6, 1850; and an affidavit of two long-time friends of the
Johnsons who testified that Elias and Nancy Johnson had lived and
cohabited together as man and wife from the date of their marriage
up until Mr. Johnson's enlistment in the army, and that they had
been regarded as husband and wife by their community.'
Preachers were not the only officials who presided over the
marriages of enslaved people. Masters sometimes did so as well.
Susan and Allen Alexander were both purchased as children by
Charles Whitmore and taken from Virginia to his Mount Pleasant
plantation in Mississippi. In or around 1838,85 they were married by
their master in a ceremony described in the following way:
[T]hey stood up before him and he ask [sic] affiant if she was
willing to take Allen as her husband and do for him all that a
woman should and he asked Allen the same about affiant from
that time until Allen was taken while in the army they lived
84. See Affidavit of Joseph Dozier and James H. Johnson (July 21, 1881), in id. On May 9,
1872, Milly Williams was awarded a pension due to the war-related death of her husband,
George (which had occurred less than two months after he had enlisted on March 11, 1864). In
support of Mrs. Williams's claim, the couple's former owners supplied an affidavit stating that
Millie "was married at our residence in the County of Cole & State of Missouri to George
Williams colored man in 1859 by Isaac Handy a colored ex porter .... Milly and George
Williams lived and cohabited together as man and wife from the day of marriage to the time of
his entering the army as man and wife, were so regarded by the affiants and all their friends
and neighbors then & until death." Affidavit of Theodore Stanley and Martha M. Stanley (July
14, 1869), in Pension File of George Williams (certificate 157,858), N.A. R.G. 15, supra note
47.
Similarly, Margaret Johnson was found to have been the lawful wife of Elija Johnson, a
colored soldier who was killed in action on August 16, 1864, in Deep Bottom, Georgia.
Affidavits supplied in support of Mrs. Johnson's pension claim showed that they had been
married by the Reverend Abraham Freed, a minister in Somerset County, Maryland, on
November 2, 1856. According to the documents, the Johnsons had lived together for 11 years
prior to their marriage, during which time they had had two daughters, one in 1851 and
another in 1853. See Pension File of Elijah Johnson (certificate 114,336), N.A. R.G. 15, supra
note 47. The file does not indicate why they chose to marry in 1856, having "lived together as
man and wife for several years preceeding [sic] their marriage." Affidavit of Rev. Nathan C.
Conner (Dec. 23, 1867), in id.
It is really quite remarkable that in states such as Maryland, Missouri, and Arkansas, border
states that had been occupied by Union troops and that had had military governors appointed
by Washington in 1862, former slave owners were willing to support the claims of their former
slaves for pensions related to their husbands' service in the Union army.
85. See Affidavit of Susan Alexander (Dec. 26, 1874), in Pension File of Allen Alexander
(certificate 97,533), N.A. R.G. 15, supra note 47 ("[T]hey were married a great many years ago,
she can not tell when.").
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together and cohabited as husband and wife."' -
While other slaves on the Mount Pleasant plantation regarded Mr.
and Mrs. Alexander as living together as husband and wife, they
were unaware that the Alexanders had undergone a formal marriage
ceremony conducted by their owner. Louisa Woods, another slave
owned by the Whitmores, testified that "they were not married at
their owners just took up with each other and lived together for
many years they were living together for at least 15 years.' '7 While
this fact did not affect Susan Alexander's claim to a war widow's
pension, it does reveal something interesting about marital norms
amongst enslaved people at that time. Louisa Woods's testimony is
evidence of Tony Kaye's thesis concerning the variety of slave
relationships that included "taking up," living together, and
marriage. The community recognized relationships as permanent,
monogamous, and sacred without requiring the marriage ceremony
as a necessary formality.
Indeed, some formerly enslaved people testified that it was not the
custom to undertake a wedding ceremony in order to create a
marriage between slaves. In January 1876, Dilly Bostick was granted
a war widow's pension, due to her husband Joseph's death from
consumption in Alexandria, Virginia, in October 1864.' With respect
to her marriage, Mrs. Bostick testified to Bureau agents that she
could "furnish no evidence of marriage, as no marriage ceremony
took place she and her husband having been married by co-
habitation." 9 A close friend of the Bosticks testified that "it was not
the custom for colored people to marry by regular ceremony."' This
statement was echoed by Christianna Poole, who explained in her
pension application that she and a man "went together in the days of
slavery both being slaves, there was no marriage ceremony.'91 These
first-hand accounts from formerly enslaved people contradict
Gutman's claim-drawn almost entirely from the reports of white
people-that "nonlegal ritual and ceremony accompanied most slave
86. Id.
87. Affidavit of Louisa Woods (Dec. 30, 1874), in id.
88. See Pension File of Joseph Bostick (certificate 171,629), N.A. R.G. 15, supra note 47.
89. Affidavit of Dilly Bostick (Dec. 19, 1887), in id.
90. Pension File of Joseph Bostick (certificate 171,629), N.A. R.G. 15, supra note 47.
91. Affidavit of Christianna Poole (Dec. 8, 1890), in Pension File of Robert Poole
(certificate 286,824), N.A. R.G. 15, supra note 47; see a/soPension File of Charles Alfred
(certificate 177,642), N.A. R.G. 15, supra note 47 ("She and her said husband being slaves at
the time [1857] and no marriage ceremony being recognized by the then existing laws of the
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marriages."'  According to Gutman, these ceremonies, such as
jumping over a broomstick, converted a "free" slave union into a
legitimate slave marriage.93 The pension records reveal, however,
that delegitimized "free" slave unions were more common than
Gutman's evidence revealed.
Instead, these records reinforce Brenda Stevenson's claim that
relationships of enslaved people took a number of forms in addition
to monogamous marriage. Many formerly enslaved women
described how they "took up" with a man, lived with him, perhaps
even had children with him, but never sought out the services of a
preacher to solemnize the relationship as a marriage.' And it was
not uncommon for enslaved men to have more than one wife. For
instance, two women claimed to be the widow of Collin Johnson and
were therefore entitled to a pension. The pension files reveal that
Mr. Johnson had married Caroline Johnson in the summer of 1861
and Harriet Johnson in June of 1862. All three of them lived on the
same plantation in Mississippi, and "it was very probable that the
soldier lived with both Harriet and Caroline at the same time."'95
Ultimately both Caroline and Harriet Johnson abandoned their
pension claims.
Daniel Allen appeared to have maintained an even more
complicated set of relationships. Two women claimed to be entitled
to pensions as his widow; however, in this case, both women were
successful. It appears from the record that Daniel Allen was enslaved
by William Allen as his personal servant and was brought to
Mississippi when William Allen and his family moved there from
Maryland in 1836.96 William Allen owned two properties in
Mississippi: a plantation on the Mississippi River and a home in
Vicksburg. Daniel Allen frequently traveled back and forth between
these two properties with his owner. It seems that Daniel "took up"
with an enslaved woman named Winnie in Vicksburg, as well as a
house slave named Henrietta on the plantation. Winnie Allen
maintained that she and Daniel were married in 1855. Upon Daniel's
death from smallpox in March of 1864, Winnie applied for and was
awarded a war widow's pension. She received this pension until her
92. GuTMAN, supra note 4, at 270.
93. See id. at 275.
94. See, e.g., Pension File of Charles Alfred (certificate 146,842), N.A. R.G. 15, supra note
47; Pension File of Daniel Allen (application 167,134), N.A. R.G. 15, supra note 47; Pension
File of Robert Poole (certificate 286,824), N.A. R.G. 15, supra note 47.
95. Letter to the Commission of Pensions from F. Farrow, Auditor (Apr. 16, 1897), in
Pension File of Collin Johnson (application 643,658), N.A. R.G. 15, supra note 47.
96. See Pension File of Daniel Allen (application 167,134), N.A. R.G. 15, supra note 47.
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After Winnie's death, Henrietta applied for a pension as Daniel's
widow as well. She maintained that she and Daniel were both house
servants in the Williams house in Vicksburg, and that she secretly
"had" Daniel without her owners' consent. Only when she became
pregnant in 1862 did her mistress find out. Mrs. Williams got angry
with Henrietta, but ultimately gave her permission to live with
Daniel. From that point forward, Henrietta and Daniel lived as
husband and wife.' After emancipation, Daniel and Henrietta
moved to Natchez, Mississippi, and were married "under the flag"
when Daniel enlisted in the army. Henrietta was regarded as
Daniel's wife until his death. The Bureau investigator concluded that
"[it seems true that the soldier did have two wives."' Because the
evidence demonstrated that Daniel cohabited with Henrietta at the
time of enlistment, and because "Winnie Allen's case is settled by
her death,"' Henrietta was awarded a pension. As part of the claim,
Henrietta Allen testified that she had not remarried after Daniel's
death-a prerequisite for receipt of a pension- although she "had
Lewis Williams for a man for a number of months." Henrietta Allen
explained that, "[h]e did not live with me but slept and stayed with
me occasionally."1" Henrietta had a child with Lewis Williams, but
the baby was stillborn.''
The distinction between marriage and "having a man" was
significant for Mary Johnson as well. When asked whether her
deceased husband was her first husband, she replied: "I never lived
with any man as his wife before I lived with my husband but I now
admit that I had one child by Jim Finley... No, I never went under
Finley's name. I never lived with Jim Finley. I simply had a child byhim., - °1 2
These records reveal that African Americans emerged out of
slavery accustomed to forming a spectrum of culturally sanctioned
intimate adult relationships. These practices, we shall see, were not
abandoned at the moment when Black people were allowed to marry
97. See Affidavit of Henrietta Williams (Feb. 23, 1883), in id; see alsoBLASSINGAME, supra
note 20, at 165 (explaining that "the marriage ceremony in most cases consisted of the slaves'
simply getting the master's permission and moving into a cabin together.").
98. Pension File of Daniel Allen (application 167,134), N.A. R.G. 15, supra note 47.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See id. The Bureau agent who worked on Henrietta's claim noted in the file that there
was no record of either the birth or burial of the child she had with Lewis Williams: "A colored
baby is of less account here to white people than a good dog and is less known." Id.
102. Affidavit of Mary E. Johnson (Mar. 24, 1907), in Pension File of Frank Johnson
(certificate 296,067), N.A. R.G. 15, supra note 47.
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legally.
African Americans retained their own definition of marriage.
Many refused to marry legally and even those who did had far
different domestic relations than those of wealthier whites.
Nonetheless, African Americans knew enough about the place
of legal marriage in southern society to use it as leverage in their
struggle to realize their own vision of freedom. 3
Thus, the reality of family formation among African Americans in
the immediate ante- and postbellum periods was more complex than
that portrayed by Gutman and other rehabilitative historians of his
era. Primary archival evidence, as well as recent secondary accounts,
indicate African Americans' nonconformance to Victorian norms in
their intimate relationships prior to emancipation. These historical
accounts surely complicate the meaning of the "right to marry"
enjoyed by freed men and women in the immediate postbellum era.
It is to this period that I now turn-an era in which African
Americans both celebrated and exercised new rights secured by the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The evidence reveals that
they did so in a way that clearly demonstrates Wendy Brown's thesis:
Legal and political recognition were used by the state as instruments
for new forms of regulation and subordination.
III. POSTBELLUM MARRIAGE LAWS AND THE CULTIVATION OF
AFRICAN AMERICAN CITIZENS
The initiation and acceptance of African Americans into U.S.
society as citizens was by no means the only logical or acceptable
implication of the end of slavery. Abraham Lincoln's initial impulse
in the 1850s was to emancipate the slaves in the border states and
transport them to Liberia. °" This preference for African American
emigration over integration echoed Thomas Jefferson's earlier
sentiment that Blacks, once emancipated, would have to be sent
elsewhere. 5
103. EDWARDS, supra note 21, at 45, 46.
104. See DONALD, supra note 69, at 166.
105. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 138-143 (William
Peden ed., 1982) (1785). Jefferson expressed concern about miscegenation: "When freed, [the
Negro] is to be removed beyond the reach of mixture." Id. at 143. This is certainly a curious
remark, given his now well-documented relationship with Sally Hemings. See generally
ANNETTE GORDON-REED, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND SALLY HEMINGS: AN AMERICAN
CONTROVERSY (1997). After resigning as Governor of Virginia, and while recovering from
being thrown from a horse, Jefferson wrote a great deal about the nature of Black people. In
his Notes on Virginia he provided a rather odd encyclopedic enumeration of the attributes of
Black people, "love seems with them to be more an eager desire, than a tender delicate
mixture of sentiment and sensation .... In general, their existence appears to participate more
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In August of 1862, Lincoln told a gathering of free Black people:
You and we are different races... [Y]our race suffer very
greatly.., by living among us, while ours suffer from your
presence .... [O]n this broad continent, not a single man of
your race is made the equal of a single man of ours .... It is
better for us both, therefore, to be separated."°
By this time, Lincoln recognized the impracticality of returning the
enslaved people to Africa, and he considered compensating them for
their harm and assisting their emigration to Central America or the
Caribbean.Y Indeed, in December 1862, he arranged for the
settlement of five thousand American Blacks in Haiti."° Prominent
African Americans who shared his pessimism about the possibility of
a truly integrated republic urged the recolonization of Liberia or the
annexation of one of the territories as a Black homeland, Kansas
being the most popular locale.1"
Yet, for a complex set of reasons, the decision was made not to
purge African Americans from United States soil, but rather to
make them United States citizens. Notwithstanding the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, as well as the enactment of various civil rights laws
beginning in 1865, it was commonly believed by white people that
citizenship had to be cultivated in African Americans. Marriage laws
and the legal regulation of intimate relationships played a significant
role in this process of cultural husbandry. Regardless of the technical
definition of United States citizenship contained in the 1866 Civil
Rights Act and Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
dominant view at the time was that African Americans in the
immediate postbellum period were not born, but could become,
citizens."' Historian Kenneth Stampp observed in 1956 that "[t]he
of sensation than reflection." JEFFERSON, supra, at 139.
106. Abraham Lincoln, Address on Colonization to a Deputation of Negroes (Aug. 14,
1862), in 5 COLLECTED WORKS 370,371 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
107. See DONALD, supra note 69, at 344; see alsoERiC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION
AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 6 (1988); GEORGE FREDERICKSON, THE BLACK
IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY,
1817-1914, at 148-49 (1971); N.A.N. Clevan, Some Plans for Colonizing Liberated Negro Slaves
in Hispanic America, 11 J. NEGRO HIST. 35, 35-49 (1926); Michael Vorenberg, Abraham
Lincoln and the Politics of Black Colonization, 14 J. ABRAHAM LINCOLN ASS'N. 23, 23 (1993).
108. See FONER, supra note 107, at 6.
109. See id. at 600-01.
110. Recall Simone de Beauvoir's similar observation about women: "One is not born, but
rather becomes, a woman. No biological, psychological, or economic fate determines the figure
that the human female presents in society; it is civilization as a whole that produces this
creature..." SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 267 (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans.,
Vintage Books 1989) (1949).
19991
25
Franke: Becoming a Citizen
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 11: 251
only way that Negroes ever learned how to live in America as
responsible free men was by experience-by starting to live as free
men.' To observers like Stampp, emancipation did not render
African Americans "responsible free men." Rather, they needed
guidance, training, and, quite frequently, coercive discipline to
acquire such a status. As Stampp observed, "[t]he plantation school
never accomplished this: its aim was merely to train them to be
slaves.""' 2 Thus, regulation by a new bureaucratic juridical apparatus
was necessary to induct African Americans into society as citizens.
A. The Importance of Marriage to Emancipated African Americans
As early as 1774, enslaved people identified the inhumanity of
slavery as lying, in significant part, in the inability to marry: "[W]e
are deprived of every thing that hath a tendency to make life even
tolerable, the endearing ties of husband and wife we are strangers to
for we are no longer man and wife than our masters or mistresses
thinkes proper marred or onmarred.""' Abolitionist Angelina
Grimk6 argued that both positive and natural legal principles
required that the United States "[n]o longer deny [African
Americans] the right of marriage, but let every man have his own
wife, and let every woman have her own husband.""14 In 1850, Henry
Bibb, an enslaved person, observed: "I presume that there are no
class of people in the United States who so highly appreciate the
legality of marriage as those persons who have been held and treated
as property."1 5 Arguing in favor of the 1866 Civil Rights Act,
Senator Trumbull specifically identified the right to marry as a
necessary aspect of citizenship."6
Thus, the right to marry figured prominently in the bundle of
rights understood to have been denied to enslaved people, and was
111. STAMPP, supra note 20, at 12.
112. Id.
113. Petition to the Governor, the Council, and the House of Representatives of
Massachusetts (May 25, 1774), reprinted in 1 HERBERT APETHEKER, AMERICAN NEGRO
SLAVE REVOLTS 8-9 (1943), quoted in PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE
CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES 109 (1997).
114. Letter from Angelina Grimkd to Catharine E. Beecher (June 17, 1837), reprinted in
THE ABOLITIONISTS: MEANS, ENDS, AND MOTIVATIONS 61-63 (H. Hawkins ed., 1972); see
also DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE GROUNDS FOR
FEMINISM AND GAY RIGTS IN CULTURE AND LAW 91-94 (1998).
115. HENRY BIBB, NARRATIVE OF THE LiFE AND ADVENTURES OF HENRY BmB, AN
AMERICAN SLAVE, WRITTEN BY HIMSELF 192 (Negro Univ. Press 1969) (1850).
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considered necessary to any robust conception of liberty."' Marriage
provided a way to establish the integrity of their relationships, to
bring a new security to their family lives, and, to affirm their
freedom .... If the prohibition on marriage had underscored
their dependent position and the precariousness of their family
ties in slavery, the act of marriage now symbolized the rejection
of their slave status.11
8
Formerly enslaved people and abolitionists generally deemed the
right to marry one of the most important ramifications of
emancipation.
After emancipation, formerly enslaved people traveled great
distances"' and endured enormous hardships20 in order to reunite
families that had been separated under slavery. Shortly after the end
of the war, southern states acted quickly to amend their constitutions
or enact statutes validating marriages begun under slavery. Laws that
simply legitimized slave marriages if the couple were cohabiting as
husband and wife when the law went into effect were quite common.
Mississippi's 1865 civil rights law was typical: "All freedmen, free
negroes and mulattoes, who do now and have heretofore lived and
cohabited together as husband and wife shall be taken and held in
law as legally married.''
117. See DAVIS, supra note 113, at 108-17; FONER, supra note 107, at 82-84; MICHAEL
GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA 133 (1985); GUTMAN, supra note 4, at 204-07; MALONE, supra note 4, at 166;
Workers, Wives, and Mothers, supra note 44, at 146-47.
118. Edwards, supra note 42, at 101.
119. See, e.g., GUTMAN, supra note 4, at 82 ("Northern Reporter John Dennett
encountered a freedman who had walked more than 600 miles from Georgia to North
Carolina, searching for his wife and children from whom he had been separated by sale.").
120. See LITWACK, supra note 4, at 234-35 (noting that "[h]usbands and wives not only
located each other in the aftermath of emancipation but made what one Federal officer
described as 'superhuman efforts' to find the children who had been sold away from them").
Freedmen's Bureau agents estimated that one in six slave marriages was destroyed by the sale
of one or both spouses, some of whom "suffered this wrong more than once." Report of John
Eaton, General Superintendent of Freedmen, Department of Tennessee (Apr. 29, 1863), N.A.
R.G. 94, supra note 3, at 91; see alsoFONER, supra note 107, at 82-84; GUTMAN, supra note 4, at
318.
121. Civil Rights Act of Nov. 25, 1865, Ch. 4, § 2, 1865 Miss. Laws 82, 82. Georgia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Virgina passed similar laws during this period. See, e.g., Act of
Mar. 9, 1866, tit. 31, § 5, 1866 Ga. Laws 239, 240 (prescribing and regulating the relation of
husband and wife between persons of color); Act of Mar. 10, 1866, ch. 40, §§ 1-5, 1866 N.C.
Sess. Laws 99-101 (concerning negroes and persons of color or of mixed blood); Act of 1865,
1865 S.C. Acts 291, 292 (establishing and regulating the domestic relations of persons of color,
and amending the law in relation to paupers and vagrancy); Act of Feb. 27, 1865, ch. 18, § 2,
1865 Va. Acts 85 (legalizing marriages of colored persons now cohabitating as husband and
wife), in JUNE PURCELL GUILD, BLACK LAWS OF VIRGINIA: A SUMMARY OF THE
LEGISLATIVE ACmS OF VIRGINIA CONCERNING NEGROES FROM EARLIEST TIMES TO THE
PRESENT 33 (1996); see a/soLAWS RELATING TO FREEDMEN, COMPILED BY COMMAND OF
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Some states took a different approach to the marriage of former
slaves, giving "all colored inhabitants of this State claiming to be
living together in the relation of husband and wife... and who shall
mutually desire to continue in that relation," nine months to formally
re-marry one another before a minister or civil authority." These
laws further required newly married couples to file a marriage
license with the county circuit court, a bureaucratic detail that
carried a prohibitively high price for many freedpeople.'" In every
state with such laws, failure to comply with these requirements while
continuing to cohabit would render the offenders subject to criminal
prosecution for adultery and fornication. 4 North Carolina gave the
freed people just under six months to register their marriages with
the county clerk. Each month they failed to do so constituted a
distinct and separately prosecutable criminal offense.
While many formerly enslaved people merely allowed the law to
operate upon them, automatically legitimizing their marriages,
others "swamped public officials with demands to validate old and
new unions."' 6 Thus, the right to marry for African Americans in the
immediate postbellum period had both symbolic and practical
significance -symbolic in the sense that enjoyment of the right
signaled acceptance into the moral community of civil society, and
practical to the extent that social and economic benefits flowed from
being legally married.
However, the right to marry was not merely an unconstrained
liberty enjoyed by African Americans independent of state interest
or control. Even prior to the end of the war, state and federal
officials played an active role in impressing upon Black people the
responsibilities, rather than the rights, that marriage imposed.
MAJOR GENERAL 0.0. HOWARD, COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF REFUGEES, FREEDMEN AND
ABANDONED LANDS, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 39-6, at 179 (1866) (a collection of Black Laws
assembled by the head of the Freedman's Bureau and submitted to Congress in 1866-67).
122. Act of Jan. 11, 1866, ch. 1469, § 1, 1865 Fla. Laws. 31.
123. North Carolina entitled the county clerk to charge the newlyweds a fee of 25 cents for
the task of filing a certificate of marriage. See Act of Mar. 10, 1866, ch. 40, § 5, 1866 N.C. Sess.
Laws 101. In 1866, 25 cents was an amount of money that put nuptial legitimacy well outside
the reach of most African Americans. Recall that war widows were expected to support
themselves and their children on eight dollars a month.
124. See, e.g., Act of Dec. 14, 1866, ch. 1552, § 1, 1866 Fla. Laws 22.
125. See Act of Mar. 10, 1866, ch. 40, §6,1866 N.C. Sess. Laws 101.
126. GROSSBERG, supra note 117, at 134; see alsoLITWACK, supra note 4, at 240-41.
Litwack comments that "[w]hatever the most compelling reason, mass wedding ceremonies
involving as many as seventy couples at a time became a common sight in the postwar South."
In addition, he notes that, "[i]n 1866 over 9,000 couples registered their marriages in seventeen
North Carolina counties." LrrwACK, supra note 4, at 133.
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B. The Role of Federal Officials in Enforcing Marriage Laws
For some time prior to the establishment of the Freedmen's
Bureau in 1865, federal officers played a significant role in the
promotion of marriage among Black people. In 1862, John Eaton
was appointed by General Grant to set up what were termed
"contraband camps," settlements that housed Black fugitives in
Tennessee and northern Mississippi. 7 In April 1863, Eaton reported
that "all entering our camps who have been living or desire to live
together as husband and wife are required to be married in the
proper manner .... This regulation has done much to promote the
good order of the camp."'" In March 1864, the Secretary of War
made Eaton's regulation official United States policy, and ordered
Freedmen's Bureau agents to "solemnize the rite of marriage among
Freedmen."' 9 Thereafter, superintendents of the contraband camps
uniformly reported that "the introduction of the rite of christian
marriage and requiring its strict observance, exerted a most
wholesome influence upon the order of the camps and the conduct of
the people." The necessary relationship between morality and
citizenship was a constant theme in the approach that federal officers
took to the management of African Americans' transition from
slavery to freedom. In hearings before the American Freedmen's
Inquiry Commission-the federal commission created in 1863 to
suggest methods for dealing with the emancipated slaves-Colonel
William Pile, the administrator of the Vicksburg, Mississippi,
contraband camp, testified to the Commission that
[o]ne great defect in the management of the negroes down there
was, as I judged, the ignoring of the family relationship .... My
judgement is that one of the first things to be done with these
people, to qualify them for citizenship, for self-protection and
self-support, is to impress upon them the family obligations."'
This view was echoed by John Eaton in his instructions to the federal
officials running the contraband camps: "Among the things to be
127. See GUTMAN, supra note 4, at 57.
128. Report of John Eaton, General Superintendent of Freedmen, Department of
Tennessee (Apr. 29, 1863), N.A. R.G. 94, supra note 3, M619, roll 200, at 89-90 [hereinafter
Eaton Report]. Gutman reports that "the earliest 'contraband marriage' for which a record
exists occurred during the first week of September in 1861." GUTMAN, supra note 4, at 412.
129. Special Orders, No. 15 (Mar. 28, 1864), in Eaton Report, supra note 128, at 89-90; see
alsoGuTMAN, supra note 4, at 18.
130. Report by Chaplain Warren (May 18, 1864), included in Eaton Report, supra note
128, at 89-90.
131. Statement of Col. William A. Pile, Testimony taken in Kentucky, Tennessee, and
Missouri, November and December 1863, N.A. R.G. 94, supra note 3, at frame 139.
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done, to fit the freed people for a life of happiness and usefulness, it
was obvious that the inculcation of right principles and practices in
regard to the social relations ought to find a place."'32
In its reports to the Secretary of War, the American Freedmen's
Inquiry Commission reflected the view dominant among whites that
Black people were uncivilized, degraded, undisciplined, and lived in
wholly unchristian ways, but that the rule of law as well as patient
guidance from whites would tame and civilize them. Thus the
Commission observed that "[t]he law, in the shape of military rule,
takes for him the place of his master, with this difference-that he
submits to it more heartily and cheerfully, without any sense of
degradation."'' Urging an active role for the federal government in
the moral cultivation of Black character, the Commission's Final
Report concluded on an optimistic note: "[T]hey will learn much and
gain much from us. They will gain in force of character, in mental
cultivation, in self-reliance, in enterprise, in breadth of views and
habits of generalization. Our influence over them, if we treat them
well, will be powerful for good."'" In support of this claim, the
Commission referred to a Canadian high school principal who
maintained that proximity to whites could even "whiten" Black
people's unattractive physical features.'35
Thus, federal officials acted as the guardians of the moral practices
of Black people in order to qualify them for citizenship. The
enforcement of marriage laws was widely regarded as the best lever
to accomplish these ends. As Michael Grossberg notes,
[a]lthough their response to most black demands for legal rights
was negative, southern whites readily granted the matrimonial
request of their former charges. The prevailing belief that
marriage civilized and controlled the brutish nature of all people
encouraged the use of formal matrimony as a remedy for the
widespread immorality and promiscuity that whites believed to
prevail among blacks."3
Much of the rhetoric of the time related to the need to civilize the
freed men and women. Gutman summarized these beliefs as follows:
"As slaves, after all, their marriages had not been sanctioned by the
132. Eaton Report, supra note 128, at 89-90.
133. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 24, at 12.
134. FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 107 n.1.
135. See id. at note t (the principal is quoted as saying that "'[clolored people brought up
among whites look better than others. Their rougher, harsher features disappear. I think that
colored children brought up among white people look better than their parents.").
136. GROSSBERG, supra note 117, at 133.
30
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss2/2
Franke
civil law and therefore 'the sexual passion' went unrestrained."'' 1
White officials informed African American audiences that "[t]he
loose ideas which have prevailed among you on this subject must
cease,"'138 and that "no race of mankind can be expected to become
exalted in the scale of humanity, whose sexes, without any binding
obligation, cohabit promiscuously together."'' 9
Freedmen's Bureau agents had their hands full dealing with the
systemic violence suffered by African Americans at the hands of
white people, including lynchings, rapes, beatings, and other brutal
assaults,'" and "outrages," as well as overwhelming white resistance
to honoring labor contracts with the newly freed Blacks. Their
weekly and monthly reports, however, are replete with exasperation
regarding the manner in which Blacks were flaunting the institution
of marriage. Agents complained that the freed men and women
persisted in "the disgusting practice of living together as man and
wife without proper marriage,"'' "living together and calling
themselves man and wife as long as it conveniently suits them,"'42 and
maintaining bigamous' 3 or adulterous1" relationships. In "many
instances," wrote one agent, "where after being legally and lawfully
married they live together but a short time. Separate and marry
again or live together without any obligation at all."'45 Time and
again, the agents complained that Blacks continued to "act as they
did in time of slavery,"'" clinging to "old habits of an immoral
137. GUTMAN, supra note 4, at 295.
138. Edwards, supra note 42, at 93 (quoting Alfred M. Waddell, a Confederate army
officer and newspaper editor).
139. Id. (quoting a member of the Commission that designed the North Carolina Black
Codes); see a/sOSTAMPP, supra note 20, at 12.
140. See GUTMAN, supra note 4, at 148; LrWACK, supra note 4, at 277-82.
141. Report from Headquarters of the Bureau of Freedmen, Refugees and Abandoned
Lands for the state of Louisiana (Sept. 30, 1867), N.A. R.G. 105, M 1027, roll 27, frame 226
[hereinafter N.A. R.G. 105].
142. Report for the month of August, 1867 for Sub District of Oxford, Mississippi (Aug.
31, 1867), N.A. R.G. 105, at M 826, roll 30, frames 147-48, see alsoReport of Operations of the
Bureau, Sub-District of Oxford, Mississippi (Aug. 31, 1867), in id. at M 823, roll 30, frames 147-
48.
143. Regarding the "possession of several wives and also several husbands," see Report for
the month of September, 1867, for the Sub District of Greenville, Mississippi (Sept. 30, 1867),
in id. at M 826, roll 30, frame 455; Report of the Sub District for Montgomery, Alabama, for
the month ending August 31, 1865 (Sept. 1, 1865), in id. at M 809, roll 18, frames 566-67.
144. See, e.g., Narrative Report for the month of August, 1867, for the Sub District of
Grenada, Mississippi, in id. at M 826, roll 30, frame 232; Narrative Report for the Sub District
of Tupelo, Mississippi, for the month ending August, 1867 (Aug. 31, 1867), in id at M 826, roll
30, frame 221.
145. Report for the month of August, 1867, from Lt. George Waller, Sub Assistant
Commissioner (Aug. 31, 1867), in id. at M 826, roll 30, frame 225.
146. Report of the Condition of the Sub Division, Woodville, Mississippi (Oct. 31, 1867), in
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character." ' 7 They were particularly outraged by the habit of "taking
up '  with a person, and then separating when they tired of one
another.'49 "It would appear to be more difficult to change their ideas
in this matter than on any other affecting their welfare,"'5 ° wrote
Alvan Gillem, Bureau agent in charge of Mississippi, in 1868. Gillem
took a particular interest in the problem of marriage among African
Americans, requiring his agents in the Mississippi sub-districts to
provide a detailed account of the freedmen's marital relations each
month.
Once emancipated, many African American people found
themselves in violation of local marriage laws for a number of
reasons. It was not uncommon for a man and woman to marry one
another while enslaved, only to experience the eventual sale of the
husband to another planter. Subsequently, the wife would marry
another man, believing, reasonably, that she would never see her
first husband again. Christianna Poole testified to exactly this set of
circumstances in her war widow pension application: "My first
husband and I went together in the days of slavery, both being
slaves, there was no marriage ceremony, and him being sold away, it
is impossible for me or anyone else to say anything about him."'
5
'
After emancipation, when formerly enslaved people struggled to
reunify relationships shattered by slavery, the first husband might
id. at M 826, roll 30; see alsoReport of Events Pertaining to Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen,
and Abandoned Lands, Sub District of Wordville, Mississippi, for the Month ending
September, 1867, in id. at M 826, roll 30, frame 486; Report for the month of August, 1867
from Lt. George Waller, Sub Assistant Commissioner (Aug. 31, 1867), in id. at M 826, roll 30,
frame 225.
147. Report of the Condition of the Freedpeople and operations of the Bureau throughout
the District for the month of January 1868 (Jan. 31, 1868), in id. at M 1027, roll 27, frames 323-
24.
148. Report from the Sub District of East Pascagoula, Mississippi for the month of August,
1867 (Aug. 31, 1867), in id. at M 823, roll 30; see alsoReport for the Sub District of Rosedale,
Mississippi, for the month of October, 1867 (Nov. 14, 1867), in id. at M 826, roll 30, frame 1002;
Narrative Report for the month of October, 1867 for the Sub District of Yazoo City,
Mississippi, in id. at M 826, roll 30, frames 784-85; Report of the Condition of the Sub Division,
Woodville, Mississippi (Oct. 31, 1867), in id. at M 826, roll 30; Narrative Report for the Sub
District of Tupelo, Mississippi, for the month ending August, 1867 (Aug. 31, 1867), in id. at M
826, roll 30, frame 221; Report of the Sub District for Montgomery, Alabama, for the month
ending August 31, 1865 (Sept. 1, 1865), in id. at M 809, roll 18, frames 566-67; Testimony taken
in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri before the American Freedman's Inquiry Commission,
November and December 1863, N.A. R.G. 94, supra note 3, at M 619-201, frame 140.
149. See Report of Events Pertaining to Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned
Lands, Sub District of Wordville, Mississippi, for the month ending September, 1867, N.A.
R.G. 105, at M 826, roll 30, frame 486.
150. Report upon the Conduct of Affairs Concerning Freedmen in Mississippi for the
quarter ending September 30, 1868 (Oct. 14, 1868), in id. at M 826, roll 3, frame 1077.
151. Affidavit of Christianna Poole (Dec. 8, 1890), in Pension File of Robert Poole
(certificate 286,824), N.A. R.G. 15, supra note 47.
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reappear and expect his wife to live with him as his wife. Thus, many
formerly enslaved people found themselves with two or more
spouses at the end of the war."2 Given that bigamy was a crime in
every state, persons with multiple spouses were forced to choose one
and only one legal spouse and to cease intimate relations and/or
cohabitation with others.'53 Georgia's 1866 law relating to "Persons
of Color" set forth the following:
[P]ersons of color, now living together as husband and wife, are
hereby declared to sustain that legal relation to each other,
unless a man shall have two or more reputed wives, or a woman
two or more reputed husbands. In such an event, the man,
immediately after the passage of this Act by the General
Assembly, shall select one of his reputed wives, with her
consent; or the woman one of her reputed husbands, with his
consent; and the ceremony of marriage between these two shall
be performed.'
The statute then instructed that persons who fail or refuse to comply
with these requirements shall be prosecuted for fornication, adultery,
or both.155 South Carolina imposed a similar statutory duty of
election.'56
Even though some state laws were silent on the question of
multiple spous6s, state and federal officials forced freed men and
women to choose one and only one spouse as a matter of practice. In
some cases where a freed man or woman was unwilling or unable to
choose, Bureau agents felt free to do so for them. An agent in North
Carolina reported that "[w]henever a negro appears before me with
two or three wives who have equal claim upon him ... I marry him
to the woman who had the greatest number of helpless children who
152. See GUTMAN, supra note 4, at 417-25; LITWACK, supra note 4, at 241-42. Gutman
describes how in some cases women who emerged from slavery with more than one husband
would choose a legal husband based upon a number of different factors, such as the man's
wealth, or the man's willingness to provide for all of her children, even those fathered by other
men. See id. at 423-25. Litwack describes how some women chose to reunite with their first
husbands, to whom they felt a special moral connection because their marriages had ended due
to the forced separation of the couple. Ex-slave Jane Ferguson chose to reunite with her first
husband, Martin Barnwell, even though she had married a man named Ferguson after her
master had sold away Barnwell: "I told [Ferguson] I never 'spects Martin could come back, but
if he did he would be my husband above all others." Id. at 242.
153. See JESSIE BERNARD, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY AMONG NEGROES 10-11 (1966).
154. Act of Mar. 9, 1866, tit. 31, § 5, 1866 Ga. Laws 240 (prescribing and regulating the
relation of husband and wife between persons of color).
155. See id.
156. Act of 1865, 1865 S.C. Acts 291, 292 (establishing and regulating the domestic
relations of persons of color, and amending the law in relation to paupers and vagrancy).
1999]
33
Franke: Becoming a Citizen
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 11: 251
otherwise would become a charge on the Bureau."'57
Many Bureau agents felt that moral suasion was insufficient to
gain African American compliance with marriage laws and
determined that the law must be looked to to solve this problem.5 '
Their frustration led them to turn adulterers, bigamists, and
fornicators over to the local authorities for prosecution under local
criminal laws. Some Freedmen's Bureau agents also encouraged
white planters to punish Blacks for adultery and fornication.'59
Gillem informed the Washington Bureau office in September 1868
that "I have caused the proper steps to be taken to bring this matter
before the Civil Courts and shall urge that offenders be brought to
trial and punished."'6 Other officers followed suit.' "The courts
alone can establish a radical cure," 62 wrote Gillem in October 1867.
George Hall fell victim to this strategy in Tupelo, Mississippi. His
wife went to the local Bureau agent and reported that her husband
had been cohabiting with another woman. The agent turned him
over to the local Justice of the Peace, who had him arrested. Law
enforcement officials explained "to him the evils of such a course of
conduct and the punishment that would be visited on him by law if
he still persisted in such actions."'63 He was released from custody
only after he promised to return to his wife and conduct himself in a
proper manner."
157. LITWACK, supra note 4, at 242- see alsoGUTMAN, supra note 4, at 420.
158. See Narrative Report for the Sub District of Grenada, Mississippi for the month of
September, 1867 (Sept. 30, 1867), N.A. R.G. 105, at M 826, roll 30, frame 426 ("Laws are
required to remedy this evil."); see alsoNarrative Report for the Sub District of Grenada,
Mississippi, for the month of August, 1867 in id. at M 826, roll 30, frame 232 ("It is no
uncommon thing for the husband and wife to [illegible] and live in adultery on the same
plantation, the planters say they do not sanction it but they are powerless to remedy the evil.
Some severe laws will have to be passed and [illegible] executed before these conditions in this
respect will be improved.").
159. See Workers, Wives, and Mothers, supra note 44, at 179.
160. Report upon the Conduct of Affairs Concerning Freedmen in Mississippi for the
quarter ending September 30, 1868 (Oct. 14, 1868), N.A. R.G. 105, at M 826, roll 3, frame 1077.
161. See, e.g., Report for the Sub District of Brookhaven, Mississippi for the month of
June, 1867 (July 15, 1867), in id. at M 826, roll 3, frame 108; Narrative Report for the Sub
District of Tupelo, Mississippi, for the month of September, 1867 (Sept. 30, 1867), in id. at M
826, roll 30; Narrative Report for the Sub District of Tupelo, Mississippi, for the month of
August, 1867 (Aug. 31, 1867), in id. at M 826, roll 30, frame 221.
162. Report of the Operations of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned
Lands for the State of Mississippi for month of October 1867 (Nov. 28, 1867), in id. at M 826,
roll 3, frames 17-18; see alsoPRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 24, at 10; Report of the
Operations of the Bureau in the State of Mississippi for the Quarter ending June 30, 1868 (July
14, 1868), in id. at M 826, roll 3, frames 959-60.
163. Narrative Report for the Sub District of Tupelo, Mississippi for the month of
September, 1867 (Sept. 30, 1867), N.A. R.G. 105, at M 826, roll 30.
164. See id.
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As Bureau agents pushed local officials to enforce the marriage
laws against the freedmen, it was not uncommon for local judges to
seek assistance from the Bureau with domestic cases that came
before them. In one instance a probate judge in Tuskegee, Alabama,
wrote to Major General Wager Swayne, head of the Freedmen's
Bureau in Alabama, seeking instruction in a case in which a
freedman with two wives sought to obtain custody of the two
children he had had with the wife with whom he did not currently
reside. Apparently he had ceased living with the wife in question
after the local prosecutor had threatened to arrest him for bigamy
some months earlier. 6' Swayne responded that the judge should
merely follow the law, a reply in keeping with Swayne's general
strategy in Alabama of authorizing local magistrates to act as Bureau
agents in most judicial proceedings.1"
Although reluctant at first, state law enforcement officials did,
after a time, heed the pleas of Gillem and others to prosecute and
jail freed men and women who persisted in maintaining "deplorable"
extra-marital relationships. The new marriage laws' automatic
legalization of slave marriages was a double-edged sword for many
African Americans. Because the laws did not require the formerly
enslaved people to "remarry" one another or register their existing
marriages with the state, African Americans were able to have their
relationships legally sanctioned and legitimized without the
additional expense of a wedding or licensing fees. The backdraft of
this policy was quite devastating for many Black people, however.
More than a few people found they bore the responsibilities that
accompanied marriage without enjoying many of the rights attendant
thereto.67
165. See Letter from Judge C.A. Stanton to Maj. Gen. Wager Swayne, Letters Received,
Sub District for Alabama (May 13, 1867), in id. at M 809, roll 13, frames 134-36. A cynical
reading between the lines of the letter suggests that he sought custody of these children for the
income he could receive from hiring them out, just as he had hired out the children of the wife
with whom he currently resided.
166. See FONER, supra note 107, at 149. This approach differed from that of most other
Bureau Assistant Commissioners, who insisted on exercising jurisdiction over many state law
disputes because of the intransigence of local judicial officers to enforce the law fairly in cases
involving freed men and women. According to Foner, Swayne's experiment failed, "for these
officials, mostly former slaveholders who had held office under the Confederacy, frequently
inflicted severe punishment on freedmen charged with vagrancy, contract violations, or
'insolence' (a crime that did not exist for whites)." Id. (footnote omitted).
167. In addition to the strict enforcement of the technical requirements of marriage
experienced by African Americans that I describe below, parents of Black children found
themselves powerless to protect their children from an oppressive child-apprentice system.
Judges were permitted to bind to white employers those children whose parents were
determined to be unable to support them. "To blacks, such apprenticeships represented
nothing less than a continuation of slavery." FONER, supra note 107, at 201. The laws
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Recall that in most states the automatic marriage statutes were
accompanied by a provision requiring the freedpeople to choose one
and only one spouse if the reunion of formerly fractured families left
people married to more than one person."6 If a man, for instance,
failed to make such a selection and continued to cohabit with two
women, he would be considered married to neither, while at the
same time vulnerable to a fornication prosecution. This is exactly
what happened to Sam Means. A Georgia jury convicted him of
fornication upon a finding that Means, "a negro man, was living with
two women as his reputed wives, and had never selected either and
made her his lawful wife, as required by the [1866] act."169
Often couples found themselves legally married when they had
never so intended. Gillem acknowledged this problem in his
correspondence to Washington in 1868:
This act was doubtless based upon the best of motives. Its effect
was to enforce matrimony between tens of thousands of
freedpeople who were ignorant of the passage of the act. A
large proportion of them is today still ignorant of the purport of
that law. It is safe to say that one half of the adult freedmen of
this state are by this law married to those with whom they
cohabit on the 25th of November, 1865, and are ignorant of their
legal marital relations.70
Southern judges stepped in after a period to rectify this unhappy
situation, and, as the following cases demonstrate, the technical
requirements of marriage laws were enforced uncompromisingly
against African Americans regardless of whether they were shown to
have understood the details or implications of this new regulatory
regime. In Williams v. Georgia,7' the male defendant, whose first
name is never mentioned by the court, was shown to have been
married to Elizabeth Williams when they were both enslaved. They
were separated by their master and sold to different owners, but
empowering judges to remove children from their parents, often after they had just been
reunited at the end of slavery, "came close to legalized kidnapping in many instances,
depriving parents of children if a white judge deemed it 'better for the habits and comfort' of a
child to be bound out to a white guardian." LrTWACK, supra note 4, at 237; see alsoEdwards,
supra note 42, at 97 (citing laws that "gave African Americans little but obligations").
168. See supra text accompanying notes 152-157.
169. Means v. State, 25 S.E. 682,682 (Ga. 1896).
170. Annual Report of the Operations of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and
Abandoned Lands for the State of Mississippi for the year ending October 14, 1868 (Dec. 12,
1868), N.A. R.G. 105, supra note 141, at M 826, roll 3, frame 1183; see alsoBrown v. State, 52
Ala. 338, 340 (1875) ("The only witness [to the alleged wedding] was an ignorant negro
woman, who probably was unable to understand the meaning of what was actually said and
done.").
171. 67 Ga. 260 (1881).
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were reunited on December 21, 1864, two months after General
Sherman marched to the sea. Thereafter, Elizabeth "associated
immorally with another, and the defendant quit her and married
another woman."'73 Since Williams had reunited with Elizabeth
before March 9, 1866 (the effective date of the act legitimizing pre-
existing slave marriages) and did not "quit" her until after that date,
he was determined to have been legally married to Elizabeth when
he married his second wife. The court rejected the defendant's
argument that he did not intend his cohabitation with Elizabeth in
1866 to amount to a legal marriage. Instead the court ruled that the
1866 Act married the couple and that "[h]is wife was unfaithful; he
got mad and married again without divorce. Being a free citizen, he
must act like one, carrying the burdens, if he so considers them, as
well as enjoying the privileges of his new condition." '174
In State v. Melton, 75 Allen Melton's conviction for bigamy was
upheld by the North Carolina Supreme Court. The trial court found
that Melton had been married to Harriett Melton when both of them
were enslaved, and that they had continued to cohabit as husband
and wife after emancipation. By operation of the state's 1866
marriage law, they were "ipso facto married (Act of 1866, c. 40) and
no acknowledgment before an officer was essential.' 17 6 Melton
subsequently married Delia Ann Teel in 1894, without having
divorced his first wife. On these facts, Melton was convicted ofbigamy."
172. One witness who testified at trial dated the couple's reunion by reference to the date
federal forces occupied Savannah. Id. at 261. It was not uncommon in this era for African
American people to date events by reference to important personal or cultural events. This
case would make an interesting addition to introductory evidence texts, as the Georgia
Supreme Court held that "[s]uch a great public event as Sherman's march to the sea, and the
time it occurred, would be judicially taken cognizance of without proof." Id. at 262. Time,
dates, and ages, in general, were something enslaved people were unable to keep account of;
they certainly did not have watches, and were unable to date their own ages because many had
been separated from their parents at an early age. See, e.g., Testimony of Charlotte Burris,
Testimony taken in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri, November and December 1863, N.A.
R.G. 94, supra note 3, at M 619, roll 201, page 81 ("Q: How old are you? A: That is what has
grieved me a good deal. I can't tell you my age to save my life. You know when children are
separated from their parents early, they don't know how old they are.").
173. Williams, 67 Ga. at 261.
174. Id. at 263 (emphasis added). The court did note, however, that the trial judge had
heeded the jury's recommendation that he receive a very light sentence for the crime. See id.
175. 26 S.E. 933 (N.C. 1897).
176. Id. at 934.
177. In contrast, in an 1864 case in which an enslaved person, Stephen King, had
represented publicly that he was married to Nancy Moreland, the court nonetheless found that
he had not committed bigamy. King had left Moreland at the end of the war, but resumed
cohabitation and sexual relations with her for roughly a year in January 1866. In 1868, he
married Henrietta Grubbs and was thereafter convicted of bigamy. At trial it was argued that
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So too, a Black man named Kirk was convicted of bigamy having
lived with a woman on the effective date of the Georgia automatic
marriage statute in 1866, left her in 1879, and thereafter married
another woman without having obtained a divorce.178 Ignorance of
the law served as no defense.
Thus, even in the absence of matrimonial intentions, African
Americans were held to the substantive obligations of marriage and
divorce imposed by the technical operation of law. The application
of the laws in this fashion was regarded as necessary to inculcate
African Americans in the obligations of citizenship - if they wanted
to be respected as citizens, they had better act like them.
Other freed men and women found themselves in legal jeopardy
when they knowingly complied with the legal requirements
pertaining to the creation of a marriage, but persisted in the old ways
by refusing to dissolve their marriages according to the technical
requirements of divorce. In 1867, Celia McConico married David
Hartwell. After two and a half years of marriage, they "mutually
agreed to separate and did then separate from each other as husband
and wife."'79 A year later McConico married Edom Jacobs and was
thereafter prosecuted for bigamy.'" At trial McConico argued that
since Alabama's 1867 law automatically solemnized pre-existing
slave marriages without legal formalities, she assumed she was able
to dissolve her marriage without legal formality.'' An Alabama jury
convicted her of bigamy and the court sentenced her to two years in
the state penitentiary. Her conviction and sentence were affirmed by
the Alabama Supreme Court."
Freedmen's Bureau agents frequently reported their dismay with
the manner in which freedpeople ignored the requirements of the
law, even when they were fully aware of its technical demands. A
King did not know that he could be punished if he married a second time without divorcing
Nancy. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed King's conviction. The court reasoned that while
enslaved persons might have called their relationships "marriages," they may not have
comprehended the sacredness of the marriage tie:
[Tihere were also a large number of cases among slaves where the marriage tie was very
loose. It had not the sanction of law; and circumstances, inevitable in in [sic] their
character, made it liable to many interruptions, and when freedom was cast suddenly
upon the race, it is not strange that for some time both men and women should cohabit
under circumstances where it was very doubtful what was the true relation which they
proposed to occupy to each other. They might be man and wife, they might be living
together immorally.
King v. Georgia, 40 Ga. 244, 247-48 (1869).
178. See Kirk v. Georgia, 65 Ga. 159 (1880).
179. McConico v. State, 49 Ala. 6, 6 (1873).
180. See id.
181. See id. at 7.
182. See id. at 8.
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local agent in Mississippi wrote in 1867 that he would
hear of men leaving their wives and running away with other
women to parts unknown and some women leaving their
husbands, taking up with other men. I feel confident these acts
are not done through ignorance of the law in such cases, but
more from the want of a will to comply with the law. I have
explained the law to them with reference to adultery etc. but
without much avail.183
Thus, freedpeople who "took up" or were "sweethearts" but who
failed to formalize their relationships in accordance with the law
were prosecuted for adultery, fornication or both. Others who
neglected or chose not to comply with technical requirements for
obtaining a divorce, and began a sexual relationship with another
person not their lawful spouse, were prosecuted for adultery, bigamy
or both.
Marital infidelity or immorality also formed the basis for the denial
of pension benefits for African Americans war widows who had
lawfully married after 1866 but behaved in what was considered an
unseemly manner after the death of their husbands. When Congress
amended the pension laws in 1866, it included a provision denying
pension rights to a widow Who was shown to have engaged in
"immoral conduct."'" The 1882 amendments required the
termination of a widow's pension where she was shown to live in an
"open and notorious adulterous cohabitation.' 1 85 Mary Johnson fell
victim to these provisions when her pension claim was rejected
because she was found to have "cohabitated with other men from
within two or three months after the death of her husband."'
'1
Similarly, Elizabeth Johnson lost her claim for a pension when the
investigator concluded that "for more than twenty years she was
mistress of one of the most disreputable houses of prostitution" in
New Orleans."
The Freedmen's Bureau, working in tandem with local law
183. Narrative Report for the Sub District of Tupelo, Mississippi, for the month ending
August, 1867 (Aug. 31, 1867), N.A. R.G. 105, at M 826, roll 30, frame 221; see alsoNarrative
Report for the Sub District of Tupelo, Mississippi, for the month ending October, 1867 (Oct.
31, 1867), in id. at M 826, roll 30, frame 812 ("There is much need of a reform with reference to
the marriage relations of the freed people in this Sub District, they either do not understand
the law in this particular, or disregard its teachings. I am inclined to think the latter.").
184. Act of June 6, 1866, ch. 106, § 11, 14 Stat. 56 (1866).
185. Act of Aug. 7, 1882, ch. 438, § 2 (amending 57 U.S. REv. STAT. § 4702).
186. Pension File of Eli Johnson (application 253,796), N.A. R.G. 15, supra note 47.
187. Letter from Henry H. Molers, Special Examiner, to Hon. John C. Black,
Commissioner of Pensions (Feb. 18, 1888), in Pension File of Edward Johnson (application
215,782), N.A. R.G. 15.
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enforcement authorities, undertook an aggressive campaign to force
freed men and women to comply with the requirements of local
marriage laws. As such, the "right to marry," so celebrated in many
quarters, was experienced by many African Americans of this era as
an unwelcome and punitive responsibility that resulted in the
incarceration of many people.
C. Black Community Enforcement of Traditional Marital Norms
Many African American people were acutely aware of the
symbolic role that marriage played in the transformation of their
status from slave to citizen. Northern Black elites were often as
judgmental as whites when it came to the practices of poor Blacks.
Laura Edwards noted that
[m]any African-American leaders were quite aware that white
northerners and southerners alike used marriage as a barometer
of their people's fitness for freedom, and they urged poor blacks
to adopt the domestic patterns common among elite whites.
This, they argued, would help convince the nation that ex-slaves
deserved the rights and privileges of freedom."s
In support of this effort, one African American leader argued, "[l]et
us do nothing to re-kindle the slumbering fires of prejudice between
the two races. Remember, we are on trial before the tribunal of the
nation and of the world, that it may be known.., whether we are
worthy to be a free, self-governing people.""s
The work of transforming formerly enslaved people into citizens
was not left to the state alone. The task of discipline and punishment
for those who kept up the old ways was taken up by Black people
themselves. Dan Johnson, it appears, did not consider marrying the
woman with whom he had lived for many years until he sought to
become a member of the St. John's Lodge of Odd Fellows in 1868.
188. EDWARDS, supra note 21, at 56.
189. Remarks of James H. Harris, quoted in id. at 56. Immediately after the war, Federal
Freedmen's Bureau officers also compiled lists of exemplary African American men who
might be appointed to various political offices in the military governments set up by the
Bureau after Congress passed the first Reconstruction Act. See Richard Lowe, The Freedmen's
Bureau and Local Black Leadership, 80 J. AM. HIST. 989 (1993). Lowe argues that the "black
men who, in [the Bureau's] opinion, had demonstrated some ability and capacity for leadership
in the two years since the end of slavery," were more than likely light skinned. Id. at 992.
Bureau agents explicitly disfavored "black men who had already established a reputation for
alienating the native white community." Id. at 995. Thus, Lowe concludes, the "black leaders"
listed by Bureau officers were not, in many cases, the people whom the Black community
would have identified had they been asked. Here, as elsewhere, the freedmen who won the
praises of white military and civilian authorities served as examples against which "bad blacks"
were unfavorably compared for refusing to play within the bounds of white supremacy and
Victorian ideology.
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After his death, his widow applied for a pension, and one witness
testified that "they were living together in adultery at the time he
petitioned to become a member .... [T]he Lodge would not let him
join until he married."'"
In Taylor v. State,' an African American man accused of having
two wives was prosecuted for violating Mississippi's bigamy law. At
the end of the trial, the typed charge sent to the racially mixed jury
mistakenly contained the district attorney's written comments: "This
is among a people of loose ways; try to elevate your race. '"" 2 The
defendant was thereafter convicted. On appeal, the Mississippi
Supreme Court interpreted the district attorney's holographic
instructions as a message to the Black members of the jury:
[I]nasmuch as the accused was a colored man, and a number of
his own race were on the jury, the words were liable to be
mistaken by the jurors for a portion of the charge, and as
constituting a judicial exhortation to convict the prisoner for the
good of the race. 93
Notwithstanding this reading, the appellate court found the district
attorney's admonition to be harmless error.94
Dennis Taylor's conviction for bigamy and Dan Johnson's
compliance with Odd Fellow rules reflect three key aspects of the
cultivation of Victorian norms in African Americans. First, "civilized
Blacks" were performing their duty as members of society by sitting
on a jury-a right only recently afforded African American men-or
by joining civic clubs. Second, those very model citizens were acting
as instruments in the policing and punishment of undomesticated or
uncivilized Blacks who had persisted in behaving in the "old ways."
Third, Dennis Taylor, having been convicted of a felony, of course
was sent to jail, but also most likely lost the right to vote and sit on
juries. As such, he was legally and socially segregated from his
brothers, who earned the status of citizen by comporting themselves
correctly in their roles as jurors and guardians of Victorian moral
values.
Colored newspapers also played a role in encouraging African
American people to understand their responsibilities relative to the
190. Pension File of Dan Johnson (application 429,023), N.A. R.G. 15, supra note 47.
191. 52 Miss. 84 (1876).
192. Id. at 88.
193. Id. at 88-89.
194. See id. The court also rejected another ground asserted by the defendant to set aside
the verdict. The former master of the defendant was a member of the jury and had stated to
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marriage relation. The Savannah Tribune, formerly The Colored
Tribune, printed an editorial in November 1876 strongly counseling
Black women against "Marrying in Haste":
Do not place yourself habitually in the society of any suitor until
you have decided the question of marriage; human wills are
weak, and people often become bewildered and do not know
their error until it is too late .... A promise may be made in a
moment of sympathy, or even half delirious ecstasy, which must
be redeemed through years of sorrow and pain.195
In like fashion, the Semi-Weekly Louisianan cautioned its readers to
consider the sanctity and magnitude of the marital obligation so as to
avoid a wedding being a "sudden and unconsidered thing-the freak
or the passion of an excited hour.' %
These examples show that by the mid-1870s some African
Americans were both performing within and serving Victorian
cultural institutions, at once evidencing their own successful
domestication and regulating those who did not conform to larger
cultural norms relating to sex, gender, and sexuality. For some,
conformity to these norms was a price paid instrumentally for the
respect they believed it would buy. For others, no doubt, this was
what it meant to be a free person.
IV. THE REGULATION OF AFRICAN AMERICAN MARRIAGE
RELATIVE TO OTHER VICrORIAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
The regulation of African American intimate heterosexual
relationships did not take place in a cultural vacuum, of course.
Rather, Blacks jumped, or were pushed, into a fast-moving stream
whose flow they were in no position to resist. As a result, they found
themselves pulled under by the often contradictory currents of those
who sought to renegotiate a number of fundamental social identities
and policies through the institution of marriage. The
uncompromising enforcement of marriage laws against African
Americans contrasted with a period of lax enforcement of those
same laws against whites. This seeming anomaly can be explained
only partially, I believe, by reference to the racism of southern
judges and prosecutors. The strict enforcement of marriage laws for
persons of color was also a necessary part of a larger cultural
transformation of the relationship between production and
reproduction. Marriage laws were used in the latter half of the
195. Marrying in Haste, SAVANNAH TRIB., NoV,. 13, 1876, at 4.
196. Hasty Marriages and Divorces, SEMI-WEEKLY LOUISIANAN, May 28, 1871, at 1.
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nineteenth century to delimit the family as a place of dependency
that stood opposed to the realm of independence and agency
enjoyed by white men in the wage-labor market. As such, the
advocates of this particular masculine position had an investment in
African American respect for and compliance with marriage laws
that operationalized the boundary between dependency and
autonomy. To allow the freed men and women to liberally negotiate
the terms of what it meant to be a husband and a wife threatened to
undermine their position in a larger social struggle over masculine
agency and feminine dependency.
A. Nineteenth-Century Family Law Reform
By the middle of the nineteenth century virtually every state
recognized the viability of common-law marriage, allowing the
Supreme Court to declare a consensus on the issue among courts and
commentators alike when it approved the doctrine in Meister v.
Moore." In this sense, the rise of common-law marriage reflected a
generally observable trend in the reform of legal relationships during
the Progressive Era, most often characterized as the transformation
from status to contract.'98 While this generalization is arguably true
for some aspects of nineteenth-century society, it would be too
simple a description of marital relations during this period.1 Instead,
as Ariela Dubler has persuasively demonstrated, the law of marriage
in the Gilded Age reflected a hybrid of status and contract, or
"status-contract,"2 " where courts often spoke in terms of contract but
applied notions of status, or intoned the importance of socially
created status and then applied the rules of contract."'
197. 96 U.S. 76 (1877) (stating that common-law marriage "has become the settled
doctrine of the American courts.").
198. See generally MORTON HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780-1860 (1977).
199. See Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2147 (1996) ("[T]he conventional 'status to contract' story told about the
nineteenth-century reform of marriage law obscures as much as it reveals about the evolution
of the marital relationship in the modern era."); Ariela R. Dubler, Note, Governing Through
Contract: Common Law Marriage in the Nineteenth Century, 107 YALE L.J. 1885, 1891-95
(1998).
200. Dubler, supra note 199, at 1907.
201. See id. at 1912-15. In 1892, the Supreme Court of Washington in In re McLaughlin's
Estate, 4 Wash. 570 (1892), refused to recognize the marriage of a couple who had failed to
comply with the state's formal matrimonial requirements. In so doing, the court explained its
insistence on compliance with technical formalities as an essential element of legal marriage:
By adhering to the statutory provisions all objectionable cases of this kind are
eliminated, parties are led to regard the contract as a sacred one, as one not lightly to be
entered into, and are forcibly impressed with the idea that they are forming a relationship
in which society has an interest, and to which it is a party.
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Despite the general acceptance of common-law marriage by the
judiciary, legislative reformers of this era voiced concern about a
crisis of the family provoked by the perceived ease with which
divorce could be obtained,2" the prevalence of male promiscuity,2 3
the incidence of polygamy amongst certain social groups,2' and the
nascent feminist movement, which was diminishing the traditional
role of the husband as the head of the household. 5 "Each departure
from orthodoxy ... undermined needed domestic division of labor,
sexual restraints, paternal authority, and household economic
responsibilities."' Increasingly, marriage was positioned as an
institution that would "save the race from moral ruin."2 °7 This anxiety
about moral chaos reflected reformers' more general preoccupation
with the perceived disintegration of social order.'
Id. at 590 (emphasis added).
202. In the first half of the 19th century, some southern states allowed divorce exclusively
by petition to the state legislature, and then only with great hesitation. See NELSON MANFRED
BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO 51 (1962). According to Blake, South Carolina granted no
divorces during the entire antebellum period. Id at 63. "By 1867, at least 33 of the then 37
states had prohibited legislative divorce," id. at 56, yet the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of legislative divorce as late as 1888 in Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 208
(1888). As state legislatures were becoming overwhelmed by divorce petitions, however, the
responsibility for granting divorces was gradually shifting to the courts. By 1897, all of the
states had eliminated legislative divorce. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of Passage:
Divorce Law in Historical Perspective, 63 OR. L. REv. 649, 655 (1984).
203. See GROSSBERG, supra note 117, at 10-11.
204. In 1856, the Republican Party condemned slavery and polygamy as the "twin relics of
barbarism." 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1840-1956, at 27 (Donald B. Johnson & Kirk H.
Porter eds., 1973); see alsoSarah Barringer Gordon, "The Liberty of Self-Degradation":
Polygamy, Woman Suffrage, and Consent in Nineteenth-Century America, 83 J. AM. HIST. 815
(1996).
205. See, e.g., The Future of the Family, 7 THE NATION 453, 454 (1868) ("[T]he women's
rights movement... is doing much to weaken the family bond. One effect of it is undoubtedly
to make women more and more unwilling to accept the theory of their position taught by the
church and held by men, and to make men think more and more lightly of the responsibility of
keeping the family pure and intact.").
206. GROSSBERG, supra note 117, at 10-11.
207. Society and Marriage, 10 THE NATION 332, 332 (1870). The race to which the author
referred is, presumably, the human race.
208. Frank Gaylord Cook gave voice to this bourgeois anxiety in a series of articles in The
Atlantic Monthly in 1888. This distress derived, in significant part, from the United States'
profound transformation from a relatively homogeneous nation to one characterized by racial,
ethnic, and religious diversity. In this new world order, social respectability, moral discipline,
and social order were much more difficult to maintain, necessitating the deployment of
institutions such as marriage to restore badly needed discipline. See Frank Gaylord Cook, The
Marriage Celebration in the Colonies, 1888 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 350; Frank Gaylord Cook,
The Marriage Celebration in Europe, 1888 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 245; Frank Gaylord Cook,
The Marriage Celebration in the United States, 1888 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 520; Frank Gaylord
Cook, Reform in the Marriage Celebration, 1888 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 680; see alsoDubler,
supra note 199, at 1903-05. The enthusiasm with which southern legislatures enacted laws
prohibiting miscegenation clearly derived from a similar concern with the deterioration of
natural boundaries and the proper social order more generally.
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Attacks on common-law marriage formed one of the centerpieces
of the marital reform movement of this era. These attacks were
grounded in the notion that marriage was not like other contracts,
which the parties can create and dissolve at will, but was rather a
special kind of status-creating compact in which society had a
particular interest. As a consequence, state after state enacted
positive laws setting forth the terms of valid marriages and limiting
the means of dissolution.2'
Undergirding these reform efforts lay two important norms of
particular relevance to the application of these marriage laws to
newly freed African Americans. First, formal marriage, it was
believed, performed the very important social function of taming
wanton licentiousness and civilizing uncontrollable desire: "[T]he
first object of marriage still is to regulate [sexual passion]."21° For some
reformers and courts of this period, common-law marriage was too
fluid an institution to accomplish this crucial disciplinary function:
"These loose and irregular contracts, as a general thing, derive no
support from morals or religion but are most generally founded in a
wanton and licentious cohabitation. 211
Second, reformers increasingly convinced both legislatures and
courts of the public stake in marriage. While marriage was treated as
a civil contract, it was a special kind of contract insofar as the state
was obligated to enact laws prescribing who could marry and
according to what positive legal requirements, as well as imposing
significant restraints upon the terms of exit, or divorce. The
Washington Supreme Court advanced this view when it held in 1892
that,
[a]fter the marriage relation is entered into, it is then considered
in light of a civil institution, in which the state itself has an
interest, as well as the parties. And the interest of the state is
that these contracts shall be permanent and not revokable [sic]
at the will of the parties.212
209. These reforms took the form of numerous statutes setting forth nuptial fitness,
licensing and registration requirements, and substantive requirements dictating the nature of
the commitment the husband and wife were making to one another. "These laws challenged
the common-law reliance on consent as the major test of nuptial fitness," and in its place
imposed a requirement that the parties possess proper matrimonial intentions, that is, the
intent to set up and maintain a household grounded in republican family values. GROSSBERG,
supra note 117, at 64-152. See In re McLaughlin's Estate, 4 Wash. 570, 572 (1892) ("under our
statutory regulations a marriage ceremony must be performed in one of the ways pointed out
by the statute in order to render a marriage valid.").
210. Society and Marriage, supra note 207, at 332 (emphasis in original).
211. Denison v. Denison, 35 Md. 361,381 (1871).
212. In re McLaughlin's Estate, 4 Wash. at 575; see alsoHendrik Hartog, Marital Exits and
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All of these views of marriage were invoked by the Supreme Court
in 1888, when Justice Field summarized the status of marriage during
the era of reform: "Marriage, as creating the most important relation
in life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization of a
people than any other institution, has always been subject to the
control of the legislature. ' 21'3 Thus the Court concluded that marriage
"is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public
is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of
society, without which there would be neither civilization nor
progress. 21 '4 For Victorian legislators and jurists alike the question of
legal marriage involved "the best interests of society, and the
preservation of the home and family-the foundation of all
society."" 5
Despite significant legislative reform of marriage during this
period, many courts persisted in recognizing common-law marriages
well into the next century. They did so, however, by tacitly adopting
a rule of recognition that, in the end, advanced the social policy
objectives of those concerned about licensing depravity with lax
marriage laws. Thus, courts of this era were willing to validate
marriages that were deficient in form, yet traditional in substance. At
the same time, they expressed significant moral opprobrium toward
those couples who sought to renegotiate the fundamental normative
structure of marriage in their nonconforming couplings,216 and
Marital Exemptions in Nineteenth-Century America, 80 GEO. L.J. 95, 97-98 (1991); Dubler,
supra note 199, at 1903-05.
213. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (arguing that a legislative grant of a divorce,
without the consent of the wife, to a husband who had breached the marriage contract by
abandoning his wife, was an impairment of contract).
214. Id. at 211.
215. Id. at 588.
216. Two nineteenth-century domestic relations cases are particularly good examples of
the Gilded Age movement away from common-law marriage and toward the establishment of
marriage as an inherently public, not private, institution. In Kansas v. Walker, 36 Kan. 297
(1887), the Kansas Supreme Court described how Lillian Harman and E.C. Walker had
entered into an "autonomistic marriage," id. at 297, in which they had declared to one another
that "[m]arriage, being a strictly personal matter, we deny the right of society, in the form of
church and state, to regulate it, or interfere with the individual man and woman in this
relation." Id. at 299. They then acknowledged to one another that a life-long commitment may
be an unrealistic promise, and that
[t]he promise to "love and honor and obey so long as both shall live" commonly exacted
of woman, we regard as a highly immoral promise. It makes woman the inferior, the
vassal of her husband, and when from any cause love ceases to exist between the parties
this promise binds her to do an immoral act, viz.: it binds her to prostitute her sex-hood
at the command of an unloving and unlovable husband.
Id. E.C. Walker then declared that "she remains sovereign of herself .... I cheerfully and
distinctly recognize this woman's right to the control of her own person; her right and duty to
retain her own name; her right to the possession of all property... Id. at 300. Both Lillian
Harman and W.C. Walker were thereafter convicted of violating the state's fornication statute
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toward men who "treated bigamy as an informal means of common-
law divorce."2"'
Yet, these accounts of Gilded Age courts' willingness to persist in
lax enforcement of marriage laws and strict enforcement of divorce
laws218 seem to better describe the experiences of white people than
people of color. Recall how federal officials zealously attempted to
persuade refugees in the contraband camps and, later, freed men and
women to comply with the technical requirements of marriage
laws."9 Even where freed men and women were found to have
entered into traditional couplings but innocently transgressed the
formal requirements of marriage, they were subject to the full weight
of legal sanctions,' whereas a similarly mistaken white couple would
most likely have escaped the attention of local prosecutors or
courts."2
Here, as virtually everywhere else, race and racism shaped the way
social policy was advanced through public institutional means. First,
it is important to acknowledge the different views held by federal
and local officials during this period. While federal officers believed
the best -interests of both the freed people and society at large
required African Americans to comply with marriage laws, local
and given jail sentences of 45 days and 75 days respectively. The Kansas Supreme Court
affirmed their convictions and sentences on the grounds that the state could legitimately
punish people of this ilk who refuse to comply with the formal legislative requirements for
marriage. Interestingly enough, the court held that even if the marriage were found to be a
valid common-law marriage, the legislature could impose a punishment for the parties' failure
to ratify the substantive form of the marital relationship: taking each other as man and wife. Id.
at 307. "Punishment may be inflicted on those who enter the marriage relation in disregard of
the prescribed statutory conditions, without rendering the marriage itself void" Id. at 304. As
the Chief Justice, concurring, made clear, "society is supremely interested in having marriage
entered into" according to the statutory requirements. Id at 309 (Horton, C.J., concurring).
In Peck v. Peck, 155 Mass. 479 (1892), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was asked
to decide the validity of a "copartnership" entered into by a man and a woman in 1877:
Recognizing love as the only law which should govern the sexual relationship, we agree
to continue this copartnership so long as mutual affection shall exist, and to dissolve it
when the union becomes disagreeable or undesirable to either party. We also agree that
all property that shall be acquired by mutual effort shall be equally divided on the
dissolution of said copartnership ....
Id. at 479-80. After living together for 11 years pursuant to this contract, the man in the
relationship left, and the woman sought a divorce and alimony on the ground of desertion. The
court rejected her petition, holding that "[t]here being no marriage, their subsequent
cohabitation points only to the illegal contract under which it began." Id. at 480.
217. Timothy J. Gilfoyle, The Hearts of Nineteenth-Century Men: Bigamy and Working
Class Marriage in New York City, 1800-1890, 19 PROSPECTS 135, 151 (1994).
218. See OTro E. KOEGEL, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 105-60 (1922); WILLIAM L. O'NEILL, DIVORCE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
26-27 (1967); Dubler, supra note 199, at 1909.
219. See supra notes 128-150
220. See supra notes 171-174, and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76 (1877).
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officials were far less adamant. Freedmen's Bureau agents frequently
expressed frustration at the fact that local authorities22 and juries223
initially failed to take the freedmen's flouting of marriage laws as
seriously as did the Bureau. By 1868, Bureau agents concluded that a
few prosecutions might well serve as a more persuasive means of
scaring the freedmen into compliance with the law: "It is to be hoped
that the civil authorities of the State will soon recognize the necessity
of taking action in a matter in which all good citizens should feel an
interest and by a few proper examples exert a salutary effect upon
the masses.
'224
The initial sluggishness of local officials to heed federal officials'
calls to enforce the marriage laws against African Americans can be
further explained by the racist and hetero-patriarchal views many
southerners held about the respectability of marriage generally.
Given great skepticism that the freed men and women would adhere
to the sacred vows that marriage entailed, together with disgust that
African American wives might acquire an unearned elevation in
status by playing the lady to their husbands' gentlemen,225 some
southern civic leaders voiced concern that legitimating African
American marriages would cheapen the respectability that their own
wives enjoyed as veritable southern ladies. 6
222. See, e.g., Narrative Report for the Sub District of Macon, Mississippi, for the month of
August, 1867 (Sept. 4, 1867), N.A. R.G. 105, at M 826, roll 30, frames 160-61 ("The civil
authorities pay no attention in these matters between the freemen concerned."); Annual
Report of the Operations of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands for the
State of Mississippi for the year ending October 14, 1868 (Dec. 12, 1868), in id. at M 826, roll 3,
frames 1182-84 ("[B]oth judges and juries are loth [sic] to punish freedmen for a violation of
obligations which are generally incurred by a solemn consent.").
223. See Narrative Report of the Sub District of Macon, Mississippi, for the month of
October 1867 (Nov. 9, 1867), in id. at M 826, roll 30, frame 775 ("Four or five cases of adultery
were tried at the recent term of the Circuit Court and in no [sic] one instance did the jury
convict."); Report for the month of September, 1867, for the Sub District of Greenville,
Mississippi (Sept. 30, 1867), in id. at M 826, roll 30, frame 455 ("The courts and grand juries of
these counties, as far as I can ascertain, have never taken any notice of this misconduct in these
particulars.").
224. Report of the Operations of the Bureau in the State of Mississippi for the Quarter
ending June 30, 1868, (July 14, 1868), in id. at M 826, roll 3, frames 959-60; see alsoFrankel,
supra note 44, at 180.
225. "[Fjormer masters protested that freedwomen aimed 'to play the lady and be
supported by their husbands like white folks.' For them, the exchange of a husband's support
for a wife's service at home symbolized white supremacy, but when mirrored in black
marriages was a sign of profligacy." STANLEY, supra note 8, at 189 (quoting letter from M.C.
Fulton to Brig. Gen. Davis Tilson (Apr. 17, 1866)).
226. See 3 ARTHUR W. CALHOUN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY 39-40
(1919) (quoting a Mississippi physician: "And by God, youah so-called constitution tears down
the restrictions that the fo'sight of ouah statesmen faw mo' than a century has placed upon the
negro in ouah country. If it is fo'ced on the people of the state, all the damned negro wenches
in the country will believe they're just as good as the finest lady."); EDWARDS, supra note 21,
at 147-52, 166-67; JONES, supra note 58, at 59-60.
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While the racism of local leaders in the postbellum south should
not be minimized, racism alone cannot explain the manner in which
the state aggressively regulated African American marriages after
emancipation. The disintegration of previously salient social
boundaries, a fear of social disorder, and the increase in
industrialization provoked a reexamination of masculine agency in
which African Americans played both witting and unwitting roles. It
is to this issue that I now turn in order to provide a more complete
account of the way African Americans were inducted into the
institutions of marriage and civil society.
B. Postbellum Re-imagination of Masculinity
In some important ways, nineteenth-century America could well
be characterized as a period in which contract prevailed over
coercion. Much of the momentum underlying the success of abolition
and the passage of the 1866 Civil Rights Act can be traced to a free
labor movement that idealized market actors who were free to
alienate their labor in the rapidly industrializing nation. While it is
undeniable that there was a trend during this period in favor of
common-law marriage based in freedom of contract, the robust
defense of this liberty interest vanished the moment it conflicted
with other social policy goals, such as the maintenance of the
domestic sphere as the site of female dependency. Ariela Dubler
argues convincingly that through the trope of common-law marriage,
courts were privatizing "women's dependency in the era before the
rise of the modern welfare state." 7
The liberalism of this era is perhaps most famously reflected in the
Supreme Court's Lochner decision, yet, as both Amy Dru Stanley
and Nancy Cott have argued, the era's liberalism did more than
undergird nascent industry; it also shored up white masculinity,
which had come loose from its antebellum mooring. Prior to the
abolition of slavery, "[t]he wage laborer was an independent person,
self-supporting, one who participated in the vast social exchange of
the marketplace and obeyed its rules-the polar opposite of
slavery."'  This "intellectual tradition dissociated relations of
personal dependency from transactions based on free contract ....
That indeed had been the ideological lesson of slave emancipation,
the basis for vindicating the free wage system." '229 Yet without slavery
227. Dubler, supra note 199, at 1887.
228. Amy Dru Stanley, Beggars Can't Be Choosers: Compulsion and Contract in
Postbellum America, 78 J. AM. HIST. 1265, 1272 (1992).
229. STANLEY, supra note 8, at 105.
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as the antithesis of white male agency, it fell upon liberal reformers
of the latter half of the nineteenth century to re-anchor the integrity
of white masculine autonomy in some new institutionally antipodal
position of dependency, and thereby rehabilitate the autonomous
Enlightenment man as a plausible bounded mirage.'
Enter the family and the myth of separate spheres, argue Cott and
Stanley. The freedom that contracting actors enjoyed in the
marketplace stood in opposition to the dependency that necessarily
characterized the household. Separate spheres doctrine thus
"fence[d] in the dependencies of the home, to stop them from
permeating and contaminating the marketplace where labor power
was bought and sold.""23 Thus, having lost slavery as the form of
dependency against which free labor could contrast itself, masculine
autonomy turned to marriage, the household, and femininity as
tropes against which to distinguish itself.23
As the rhetoric surrounding the institutional reform of marriage
invoked widespread concerns about immorality and respectability, it
did so in the service of installing marriage and the household as the
principal sites of private dependency. To be a husband necessarily
entailed the status of head of household, while to be a wife rendered
one structurally dependent upon the husband's support.33 The neat
trick of this ideology was at once to affirm the wife's dependence
upon the husband for support, and to deny the husband's
dependence upon the wife's unpaid household labor "without which
he could never maintain the facade of independence."'3 As Nancy
Cott observes of this period, "[h]aving and supporting dependents
was evidence of independence." '235 Thus, the self-governing free man
of the antebellum era was, or could be, master to his slaves, while
230. I borrow this marvelous term from BENEDICT ANDERSON, THE SPECTRE OF
COMPARISONS: NATIONALISM, SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE WORLD 4 (1998).
231. Amy Dru Stanley, Home Life and the Morality of the Market, in THE MARKET
REVOLUTION IN AMERICA: SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND RELIGIOUS EXPRESSIONS, 1800-1880, at
74, 86 (Melvin Stokes & Stephen Conway eds., 1996).
232. See Cott, supra note 18, at 1452 ("Independence in this sense for the male household
head existed in counterpoint to the dependence of others [within the household].")
233. The law of coverture accomplished this fine deed. See LINDA KERBER, NO
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP
(1998); CAROL PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988); Toby L. Ditz, Ownership and
Obligation: Inheritance and Patriarchal Households in Connecticut, 1750-1820, 47 WM. &
MARY Q. 256 (1990); Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of
Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181 (1995).
234. Dubler, supra note 199, at 1917 n.184. Thus, "the ideology of dependency insidiously
obscured the ways in which the family was structured to render the husband 'independent' and
the wife 'dependent."' Id.
235. Cott, supra note 18, at 1452.
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this same man became master over a household of dependents in the
postbellum period. This domestic grouping-a household headed by
a free man-emerged in the late nineteenth century as the
fundamental unit of both consumption and production.
Since "[i]ndependence inhered in the self-governing individual
who could dispose of his own labor profitably," 6 it would be
disastrous for white masculinity if Black men could exercise that self
governance in a way that undermined the stability of marriage as the
institution that bounded dependence in the home and in femininity.
Thus the freedom that African Americans enjoyed by virtue of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments had to be filtered through
larger liberal notions of freedom that were being renegotiated during
this era. Just as liberal reformers rejected the call from some
feminists to liberalize marriage laws, 7 so too postbellum officials
were shocked that African Americans thought they were free to
organize their intimate and family lives as they wished.' Freedmen's
Bureau agents were aghast that "[l]iving together in a state of
concubinage they have come to look upon as a privilege, in fact, a
right which no one has a right to interfere with." 9 An agent in
Mississippi commented incredulously that "the men contend that
they had a right to have as many women as they could support.
240
Thus, one of the overarching projects of the postbellum era was
the task of making women into wives and men into husbands.
African American people were, for better or for worse, swept up
into this social venture. Southern legislators were not, however,
willing to leave this indoctrination process to chance or to the whims
236. Id. at 1453.
237. See RICHARDS, supra note 114.
238. Some African Americans of the time refused to participate in the institution of legal
marriage because "it place[d] an impossible tax upon freedom in the form of a divorce."
CHARLES S. JOHNSON, SHADOW OF THE PLANTATION 83 (1934). In some cases, newly freed
men and women chose not to avail themselves of the formalities of legal marriage because they
regarded the institution "more binding than necessary or practical." Id. ("It gives license to
mistreatment; it imposes the risk of unprofitable husbands."); see alsoFRANKLIN, supra note
26, at 34-35.
239. Narrative Report for October 1867 from George S. Smith, Sub Assistant
Commissioner for the Sub District of Macon, Mississippi, to Lt. Merritt Barber (Nov. 9, 1867),
N.A. R.G. 105, supra note 141, at M 826, roll 30, frame 775. Alvan 0. Gillem, Bureau agent for
the State of Mississippi, expressed the same anguish to his command in Washington with
respect to the irregular domestic arrangements of the freedmen: "They appear to consider the
immemorial license which has been allowed to them in the particular as a right which ought
not to be interfered with." Report of the Operations of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen,
and Abandoned Lands in the State of Mississippi for the Month of October 1867 from Alvan
0. Gillem to Maj. General 0.0. Howard (Nov. 28, 1867), in id. at M 826, roll 3, frame 454.
240. Report for September 1867, Sub District for Greenville, Mississippi (Sept. 30, 1867),
in id. at M 826, roll 30, frame 455.
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of extra-legal suasion. Their ideological investment in the boundary
between domesticity and dependency, on the one hand, and free
labor, autonomy, and masculinity on the other was operationalized
explicitly in the Freedmen's Bureau policy and state laws passed in
the immediate postbellum period.
In its sketch of the charge to the soon-to-be formed Freedmen's
Bureau, the American Freedmen's Inquiry Commission was
unhesitating in its inclination to link the independence or agency of
freedmen and laborers to their economic responsibilities qua
husbands and fathers.241 Thus, the Commission observed that "it is
most desirable that a freedman should learn, as speedily as possible,
that emancipation means neither idleness nor gratuitous work, but
fair labor for fair usages. 2 2 Then, one paragraph later, the
Commission recommended that, "[in] connection with this regular
payment of wages.., each married [Black] laborer or soldier, at the
time his pay is received, cede a part of it, proportioned to the size of
his family, for their support.""2 3
The Bureau took such a strong position relative to the marriage of
newly freed slaves in large part because they wanted to shift the costs
of support of indigents from the state to private parties: "The issue
demanded immediate attention.., so that freedpeople would not
become a 'huge white elephant,' dependent upon the state or their
former masters for support."2 ' According to Frankel, "[tihe agency's
overriding concern was keeping blacks from depending on the
federal government for economic assistance. 2"45 By solemnizing
marriages, the husband became legally responsible for the care and
support of his wife and children, thereby relieving the state of any
obligation. To avoid any uncertainty, statutes imposing legal
responsibility for maintenance upon African American adults were
241. Virtually the first question asked of every white witness was, "[w]hat do you think of
the capability of the slaves of this state to take care of themselves?" See, e.g., Testimony of
George W. Fishback, Proprietor, St. Louis, Missouri, Testimony taken in Kentucky,
Tennessee, and Missouri, November and December 1863, N.A. R.G. 94, at M 619, roll 201,
page 141. All of the Black witnesses before the Commission where queried about their
likelihood of self-support. See, e.g., Testimony of Colored Man (name unknown), in id. ("It is a
mistaken idea that the black people cannot take care of themselves."); Testimony of Charlotte
Burris, in id. ("We have never been dependent; we have never been troublesome to anybody.
If it is little, we have enough, and are satisfied with what we have."); see a/SOPRELIMINARY
REPORT, supra note 24, at 1 ("these refugees need not be, except for a very brief period, any
burden whatever on the government.").
242. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 24, at 15.
243. Id. at 15-16.
244. EDWARDS, supra note 21, at 32 n.23.
245. Workers, Wives, and Mothers, supra note 44, at 155.
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passed in many states during this period."6
Freedmen's Bureau agents played an active role in forcing
freedmen within their control to support their wives and children.
Frequently Bureau agents adjudicated domestic disputes between
freed men and women. Jane Moon filed a complaint with an Austin,
Mississippi Agent, claiming that her husband had not supported her.
The Bureau agent noted in his monthly report that the case was
"settled by James agreeing to support her; and take good care of her
in future."2 '7 Similarly, a Louisville, Mississippi Agent reported that
"Rachael complains that her husband beats her wrongfully, and will
not support the children, Jack, present, ordered to do better by wife,
and children, or be put in jail for one week."2'8 At least one agent
observed that the cause would be advanced by authorizing Bureau




At the same time the southern states enacted laws legitimizing
African American marriages, they were careful to build into these
laws systems of masculine agency and the privatization of
dependency. In the same breath that the South Carolina legislature
declared the legitimacy of the marriages of previously enslaved
persons, they deemed paupers or persons who were public charges
incompetent to contract marriage." The Louisiana legislature
mandated that all labor contracts with freedmen for labor on
plantations be "made with the heads of the families [and] shall
embrace the labor of all the members of the family. '21' Furthermore,
married African American men in South Carolina were forced by
the state to support their families, and if they failed to do so, were
subject to a judge forcibly binding them to work for renewable year
terms -usually in the service of former slave owners. 2
246. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 9,1866, tit. 31, § 5,1866 Ga. Laws 240 ("That among persons of
color, the parent shall be required to maintain his, or her children, whether legitimate or
illegitimate.").
247. Report of Cases Tried During the Month Ending November 31, 1867, from
Headquarters of the Sub District of Austin, Mississippi (Dec. 2, 1867), N.A. R.G. 105, supra
note 141, at M 826, roll 31, frame 16.
248. Report of Sub District of Louisville, Mississippi for December 1867 (Jan. 3, 1896), in
id. at M 826, roll 31, frame 476.
249. See Report of the Sub District of Montgomery, Alabama for the month ending
August 31, 1865 (Sept. 1, 1865), in id. at M 809, roll 18, frame 567.
250. See Act of 1865, 1865 S.C. Acts 291, 292 (establishing and regulating the domestic
relations of persons of color and amending the law in relation to paupers and vagrancy).
251. HOWARD, supra note 121, at 182.
252. A South Carolina law provided that
[a] husband, not disabled, who has been thus convicted of having abandoned or turned
away his wife, or has been shown to fail in maintaining his wife and children, may be
bound to service by the district judge, from year to year, and so much of the profits of his
labor as may be requisite applied to the maintenance of his wife and children.
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The greater threat to the integrity of African American families
during this period lay, however, in the postbellum apprenticeship
system. White southern authorities respected the integrity of Black
families only in so far as parents were able to support their children
beyond a certain subsistence level. When, however, parents were
found to be paupers, 3 were not habitually employed in some honest,
industrious occupation,' were deemed to be of notoriously bad
character, 5 or where it was determined that it would simply be
better for the habits and comfort of a child, 6 a court could order that
a minor child be bound as an apprentice to some white person, often
the family's former owner,"m until the child reached the age of
majority.
These postbellum statutes are typical of the ways in which
southern legislatures permitted African Americans to participate in
the institution of marriage, but did so on terms that respected the
integrity of households they created only in so far as (1) the father or
husband performed his proper role as provider and head of
household, and (2) the household itself was the place where the
needs of dependents were met privately." 8 To the extent that poverty
or some "moral infirmity" hindered African American men from
performing the role of republican husband or father, they were
categorically denied the privilege of participation in this exalted
institution.
The challenge these legislators faced was to structure the binary
relation of free labor and domesticity in terms of autonomous
masculinity and dependent femininity, yet to do so in such a way that
these social identities could be positioned racially as well. Thus,
white men needed to grant Black men a degree of autonomy in their
collaborative project re-imagining masculine agency, but at the same
Act of 1865, 1865 S.C. Acts 291, 292. Wives were similarly subject to being bound to service
but only in relation to their failure to support their children as they bore no reciprocal
obligation to support their husbands. See id; see alsoStanley, supra note 228, at 1283-88.
253. See, e.g., Act of Nov. 22, 1865, ch. 5, 1865 Miss. Laws 86, 86-90 (regulating the relation
of master and apprentice, with respect to "freedmen, free negroes, and mulattoes").
254. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 10, 1866, ch. 40, §15, 1866 N.C. Sess. Laws 99, 104-05.
255. See, e.g., 1865 S.C. Acts 291 (establishing and regulating the domestic relations of
persons of color and amending the law in relation to paupers and vagrancy).
256. See Md. Code Ann., Apprentices, art. VI, § 31 (1860).
257. See, e.g., Act of Nov. 22, 1865, ch. 5, 1865 Miss. Laws 86.
258. This view was also expressed by the American Freedmen's Inquiry Commission in
1863: Superintendents of the Contraband Camps "will, as a general rule, find no difficulty in
inducing refugees, when bringing with them those whom they acknowledge to be their wives
and children, to consent to a ceremony, which, while it legitimizes these relations, imposes
upon the husband and father the legal obligation to support his family." PRELIMINARY
REPORT, supra note 24, at 4.
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time white men wanted to preserve the right to portray Black male
sexuality as a fundamental threat to white society.z9 Similarly,
postbellum reformers retooled the household and the family as the
natural site of dependency while determining to deny Black women
and wives the respectability that occupying that space granted to
white women. Southern officials were thus challenged to legislate on
a razor's edge, cutting a narrow path between the rights that had
been assured the freed men and women, and the interests of
liberalism, patriarchy, and white supremacy.
What is more, I have a strong suspicion that Black men were
prosecuted for bigamy, fornication, and adultery -serious crimes in
many states in the postbellum period-in part to achieve their
disenfranchisement.2  This was accomplished either explicitly
through statutes or constitutional provisions that disenfranchised
certain convicted criminals,261 or implicitly by binding African
American men to work in circumstances that made voting a practical
impossibility.
It is very likely that the prosecution of Black men for these crimes
was related to the evolution of what Jennifer Roback has termed "a
labor-market cartel among white employers" in the postbellum
period.262 In an effort to maintain the viability of the plantation
system in the absence of slave labor, southern planters enlisted the
aid of the government to "accomplish what race prejudice could not
do by itself"'263 any longer. Postbellum Black Codes made vagrancy,
poverty, disrespect for white people, and a wide array of otherwise
inoffensive conduct criminal, and African American men were
selectively and falsely prosecuted for an array of crimes. Their
incarceration made their labor available to private employers at cut
rate prices.2
The use of convict leasing and criminal surety laws assured an
abundant and cheap source of labor in the postbellum era in a
259. See Martha Hodes, The Sexualization of Reconstruction Politics: White Women and
Black Men in the South After the Civil War, 3 J. HIST. SEXUALITY 402 (1993). See generally
MARTHA HODES, WHITE WOMEN, BLACK MEN: ILLICIT SEX IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY
SouT (1997).
260. I am indebted to Denise Morgan for suggesting this connection.
261. See, e.g., MISS. CONST. of 1890, § 241 (deeming men convicted of, inter alia, bigamy
unqualifed to vote); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) (upholding the
constitutionality of § 241 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890).
262. Jennifer Roback, Southern Labor Law in the Jim Crow Era: Exploitative or
Competitive?, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 1161,1162 (1984).
263. Id.
264. See FONER, supra note 107, at 199-201.
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manner that perpetuated slave labor for African American men.
Under the convict lease system, which was particularly popular in
southern states in the 1880s,26 convicted criminals were leased from
the state by private employers to work at extremely low wages and
under working conditions that exceeded those of the antebellum
slave system in their barbarism.267 Criminal surety laws worked a
similar expropriation of labor. Under these laws, a person convicted
of a crime for which a financial penalty was assessed as sentence
could enter into a peonage contract with a bondsman who would pay
the convict's fine in exchange for allowing the surety to hire him out
until he had worked off his debt.2' In Mississippi, for instance, the
law provided that any Black person who failed to pay within five
days all fines or costs levied in connection with the conviction of a
misdemeanor "shall be hired out by the sheriff or other officer, at
public outcry, to any white person who will pay said fine and all
costs. 269 The working conditions of criminal surety peons fell below
even those of the leased criminal. In 1914, the United States
265. In 1919, Alabama Governor Thomas E. Kilby declared his state's chain gangs and
convict-lease system "'a relic of barbarism.., a form of human slavery."' GEORGE BROWN
TINDALL, THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1913-1945, at 213 (1967). See generally RAY
S. BAKER, FOLLOWING THE COLOR LINE 95-97 (1964); MARY CHURCH TERRELL, PEONAGE
IN THE UNITED STATES: THE CONVICT LEASE SYSTEM AND THE CHAIN GANGS IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 62, 308 (1907); William Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in the
South, 1865-1940: A Preliminary Analysis, in BLACK SOUTHERNERS AND THE LAW, 1865-1900
at 35, 59 (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1994); Tessa M. Gorman, Back on the Chain Gang: Why the
Eighth Amendment and the History of Slavery Proscribe the Resurgence of Chain Gangs, 85
CAL. L. REV. 441 (1997); Matthew J. Mancini, Race, Economics and the Abandonment of
Convict Leasing, 63 J. NEGRO HIST. 339, 340 (1978); Nancy A. Ozimek, Reinstitution of the
Chain Gang: A Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 753, 758-59 (1997);
Emily S. Sanford, The Propriety and Constitutionality of Chain Gangs, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
1155 (1997); Benno C. Schmidt, Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the
Progressive Era. Part 2: The Peonage Cases, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 646, 651 (1982). Mississippi
abandoned the convict lease system in 1890, Tennessee in 1895, Georgia in 1908, Florida in
1924, and North Carolina in 1933. See F. Green, Some Aspects of the Convict Lease System in
the Southern States, in THE JAMES SPRUNT STUDIES IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE:
ESSAYS IN SOUTHERN HISTORY 121 (1949).
266. See Roback, supra note 262, at 1170.
267. Because the convicts' leaseholder had no interest in keeping the workers alive or
healthy past the term of their sentence, the death rate among convict-workers was very high.
According to Roback,
the firm had no interest in keeping the convicts alive past the end of their sentence or
contract period, since the convict has no "scrap" or "resale" value. In this respect, the
lease system was worse than slavery: since a slaveholder receives the full capitalized
value of the slave's output for his entire working life, he has an incentive to maintain the
slave's health. The death rate on these chain gangs illustrate this difference: mortality
rates were as high as forty-five percent.
Id. at 1170 (footnote omitted).
268. See id. at 1175.
269. Act of Nov. 29, 1865, ch. 23, § 5, 1865 Miss. Laws 165, 167 (punishing certain
offenses).
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Supreme Court invalidated criminal surety systems as violations of
the Thirteenth Amendment,... but convict leasing programs
remained in effect up to and through the turn of the century in
Virginia, Georgia, Florida, Tennessee, Alabama, and Louisiana.7
Although these laws were racially neutral on their faces, virtually "all
the convicts caught in this lethal system were blacks."2
Thus the aggressive enforcement of bigamy, fornication, and
adultery laws against African Americans served the material needs
of white planters to repopulate the plantations with cheap, fungible
labor while at the same time denying these newly enfranchised
citizens the opportunity or right to vote.
V. CONCLUSION
This history illustrates the problem of treating the right to marry as
an unproblematic civil rights victory and in treating "slavery" and
"liberty" as antinomous terms. While the right to legally marry
brought significant economic, legal, and psychological benefits to
freedpeople, there were also harmful consequences. The larger
Victorian society had its own agenda, that the freedpeople did not
share, and that worked to the detriment of African American men
and women. These agendas were advanced in part through the use of
marriage laws. Some at the time believed that the glory of the right
to marry was that the slave master no longer functioned as the head
of the African American household. While this was true, it did not
mean that African American men and women enjoyed the kind of
matrimonial autonomy often portrayed in romanticized accounts of
this period. Rather, the state stepped in to regulate the form and
structure of African American intimate relationships in ways that
coerced freedpeople to participate in the re-imagination of
masculine agency by conforming to republican family norms while at
the same time appropriating their labor in order to repair and
industrialize the postbellum southern economy.
My aim has been to demonstrate the complexity of rights
discourses in movements for personal and politieal emancipation.
Rather than simply liberating a people to make autonomous
decisions free from state-imposed constraints, the granting of rights
signals the inauguration of a new relationship with the state. Rights
270. See United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914).
271. See Roback, supra note 262, at 1165.
272. Schmidt, supra note 265, at 651; see alsoMILFRED C. FIERCE, SLAVERY REVISITED 48
(1994) (stating that the "convict labor system [was] comprised of up to ninety percent
African-Americans"), quoted in Gorman, supra note 265, at 449.
1999]
57
Franke: Becoming a Citizen
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 11: 251
both shape political culture and produce political subjects. In the
postbellum era, African Americans acquired an identity as rights
holders and entered the "bureaucratic juridical apparatus '273 through
which those rights were negotiated. Wendy Brown frames this
dynamic in the following way: "Rights ... may subject us to intense
forms of bureaucratic domination and regulatory power even at the
moment that we assert them in our own defense.
'274
Frederick Douglass once said that freedom cannot be given, it
must be seized. An examination of the relationship of the newly
freed slaves to the state during Reconstruction suggests that
citizenship cannot be seized but must be cultivated. Marriage laws
were expressly deployed by the larger culture to discipline African
Americans who failed to "act like citizens." As Laura Edwards
observes,
[w]ithout the moral influence of marriage, many white
legislators and editorialists maintained, freedpeople would
never take responsibility for themselves and their families.
Completely ignoring the state's complicity in denying legal
marriage to enslaved people, white commentators cited its
absence as further evidence proving the immorality and
irresponsibility of exslaves.275
This is not to say that we should abandon rights-based struggles
altogether. Instead, we should appreciate the inherent complexities
that lie in such strategies. The award of rights must not be regarded
as the telos of any social movement but instead as a new location
from which to negotiate state power and the production of political
identity for individuals and groups. Again, Wendy Brown has
adroitly described the degree to which rights strategies cut two or
more ways, "naturalizing identity even as they reduce elements of its
stigma, depoliticizing even as they protect recently produced political
subjects, empowering what they also regulate. 276
Typically, the exclusion from an institution on racial or other
similarly suspect grounds provokes demands for justice articulated in
terms of equal access to that institution. The experiences of African
Americans in the postbellum era demonstrate how a demand for
institutional access must be accompanied by a critique of the
institution to which access is being sought. This critique must include
an analysis of the way in which the state always retains the power to
273. BROWN, supra note 10, at 121 n.41.
274. Id.
275. Edwards, supra note 42, at 93.
276. BROWN, supra note 10, at 121.
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manipulate participation in an institution in ways that may be at odds
with the interests of new rights holders. The experiences of African
Americans in the immediate postbellum era illustrate well this
paradox of simultaneous identity, empowerment, and regulation.
And it holds lessons for contemporary rights-based movements in
which the right to marry is held out as an intrinsic good, the
enjoyment of which is regarded uncritically as an advance in the
cause of equality and freedom.
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